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I. INTRODUCTION
Class actions facilitate private law enforcement by manipulating the financial
incentives of entrepreneurial class counsel, prompting them to act as litigation
funders by advancing their time and litigation costs. First, by aggregating claims
and permitting a fee and cost award to be assessed as to the class as a whole, the
class device makes it feasible for counsel to pursue claims that are economically
viable to investing class counsel only when joined.2 Second, by providing criteria
for courts to use when awarding fees and costs once the class action is
successfully resolved,3 fee and cost award doctrine signals to class counsel how
they may eventually profit from case investment, which, in turn, affects not only
the level of private enforcement, but, also, its quality. By aligning the interests
of class counsel and the class members-that is, by making right choices
profitable-fee and cost award doctrine has the potential to inspire loyal
representation.
Unfortunately, current fee and cost award doctrine sends the wrong signals and
thus misaligns the interests of class counsel and the class by making the
1. See John C. Coffee, Jr., The Unfaithful Champion: The Plaintiff as Monitor in Shareholder Litigation, 48
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 5, 12 (1985) ("[Alny attempt to rehabilitate the private attorney general concept can
succeed only if we move from viewing the plaintiffs' attorney in exclusively normative terms as a fiduciary who
must faithfully serve his clients and instead analyze him from an ex ante perspective as a risk-taking
entrepreneur who predictably will act to maximize his return and to minimize his risk.").
2. See Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 617 (1997) ("The policy at the very core of the class
action mechanism is to overcome the problem that small recoveries do not provide the incentive for any
individual to bring a solo action prosecuting his or her rights. A class action solves this problem by aggregating
the relatively paltry potential recoveries into something worth someone's (usually an attorney's) labor."
(quoting Mace v. Van Ru Credit Corp., 109 E3d 338, 344 (7th Cir. 1997))).
3. See FED. R. Civ. P. 23(h) ("In a certified class action, the court may award reasonable attorney's fees and
nontaxable costs that are authorized by law or by the parties' agreement.").
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investment of attorney time more profitable than investment in case costs. Unlike
time investment, which may contain a markup in the hourly rate and may
also be multiplied in the fee award, a class action lawyer's advancement of
litigation costs-including filing fees, expert fees, notice costs and other
disbursements-is merely reimbursed.4 This uneven treatment of time and cost
investment in class action litigation distorts attorney case investment incentives.
Predictably, profit-maximizing attorneys will be less inclined to pursue high cost
cases; will favor time over cost-intensive approaches to case investment, even
where cost investment would ultimately work to the advantage of class members;
and will settle prematurely to avoid relatively unprofitable cost investment
points. These perverse incentive effects inhibit justice in high-cost cases. A
solution-one William Rubenstein5 and I recently proposed-is to enable direct
cost profits in class actions, by, for example, not just reimbursing costs, but
applying a multiplier to cost investment.6
A precursor to and variant of this idea was rejected in the Agent Orange
litigation in the late 1980s when the Second Circuit reversed Judge Weinstein's
decision for awarding a form of indirect cost profits-the reallocation of a
court-awarded fee by agreement of class counsel in order to recognize the value
of cost investment. 7 The Second Circuit asserted ethical8 impediments to cost
profits, including, for example, that they created conflicts between class counsel
and the class. 9 These impediments have remained largely unexamined by courts
since the 1980s.1° Since Agent Orange, no court has championed the award of
direct cost profits in class actions.
Times have changed, suggesting that courts may or at least should now be open
to more completely harnessing class counsel's incentives to fund class actions,
4. See generally infra Section II.
5. Faculty: William B. Rubenstein, HARVARD L. SCH., http://hls.harvard.edu/faculty/directory/10742/
Rubenstein/ (last visited Nov. 21, 2014).
6. See Morris A. Ratner & William B. Rubenstein, Profit for Costs, 63 DEPAUL L. REv. 587, 612 13 (2014).
7. In re Agent Orange Prod. Liab. Litig., 818 F.2d 216 (2d Cir. 1987). An agreement by class counsel to
reallocate a fee in order to reward cost investment is an "indirect" path to cost profits because the court makes an
overall fee award in the first instance in which costs are merely reimbursed. Any reallocation via contract among
counsel does not serve to enlarge the overall award of fees and costs, and instead only redistributes a shrunken
pie. This kind of indirect re-routing of fees to compensate for cost investment is available only in the limited
circumstance where multiple firms prosecute the same case, and where the court is willing to enforce an
agreement among the firms to reallocate fees. See, e.g., In re FPI/Agretech Sec. Litig., 105 E3d 469, 472 74
(9th Cir. 1997) (rejecting agreement among counsel regarding allocation of fees that was not in proportion to
work performed); Prandini v. Nat'l Tea Co., 557 F.2d 1015, 1019 (3d Cir. 1977) (fee agreement that allocated
fees without regard to work performed was properly rejected by trial court), disapproved on other grounds by
Evans v. Jeff D., 475 U.S. 717 (1986).
8. The term "ethics" is used in this Article in the broadest sense, to include all relevant law governing
lawyers' fee and cost awards; such law includes not only the law codified in rules of professional responsibility,
but, also, relevant procedural rules and common law doctrines. See, e.g., FED. R. Civ. P. 23 and decisions
interpreting it.
9. Agent Orange, 818 F.2d at 223 24.
10. See infra note 72 and accompanying text.
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and to doing so directly in the initial fee and cost award. First, a rich academic
literature has matured since the 1980s that provides a theoretical framework for
evaluating fee and cost award doctrine's effects on class counsel's incentives."
Second, judges handling complex and large-scale multidistrict litigations have
grown increasingly accustomed to addressing the financing function of the
plaintiffs' attorneys in preliminary case management orders, especially in large
multidistrict litigation proceedings. 12 Third, alternative litigation financing has
received attention from courts, 13 academics, 14 bar associations,15  research
centers, 16 and the popular media, 17 exposing litigation financing as an area
undergoing dramatic transformation at the margins, whether or not courts choose
to guide it. Courts may or at least should be more willing in this environment to
look at change not only at the margins, where alternative funders fill (some of)
11. The framework for considering class action fee and cost award doctrine involves two conceptual moves,
popularized by Professor John C. Coffee, Jr. in the mid- 1980s. First, the language and assumptions of classical
liberal economic theory are used to describe class counsel as a self-interested, profit-maximizing entrepreneur.
See, e.g., John C. Coffee Jr., Understanding the Plaintiff's Attorney: The Implications Of Economic Theory For
Private Enforcement Of Law Through Class And Derivative Actions, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 669, 676 (1986)
(characterizing class counsel as a self-interested and risk-taking entrepreneur); Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey
P. Miller, The Plaintiffs'Attorney's Role in Class Action and Derivative Litigation: Economic Analysis and
Recommendations for Reform, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 3 (1991) ("[P]laintiffs' class and derivative attorneys
function essentially as entrepreneurs"). Second, agency cost theory is marshaled to explain why profit-
maximizing class counsel may be unfaithful to the class, given class counsel's and the class members'
asymmetric stakes and access to information. See, e.g., Coffee, supra, at 680-690 (applying agency cost theory
to explain dynamics between class counsel and class members); Macey & Miller, supra, at 19 27 (similarly
applying agency cost theory). This framework is now so pervasive as to have been described as "canonical." See
Myriam Gilles & Gary B. Friedman, Exploding the Class Action Agency Cost Myth: The Social Utility of
Entrepreneurial Lawyers, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 103, 104 (2006).
12. See, e.g., In re Pradaxa (Dabigatran Etexilate) Prod. Liab. Litig., No. 3:12 md-02385 DRH SCW, 2012
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 162110, at *2 (S.D. Ill. Nov. 13, 2012) ("This Order is entered to provide for the fair and
equitable sharing among plaintiffs, and their counsel, of the burden of services performed and expenses incurred
by attorneys acting for the common benefit of all plaintiffs in this complex litigation."); In re San Juan Dupont
Plaza Hotel Fire Litig., 111 F.3d 220, 223 25 (1st Cir. 1997) (describing trial court's early case management
orders addressing MDL common benefit expenditures, including required procedures for reporting and claiming
costs).
13. See, e.g., Miller UK Ltd. v. Caterpillar, Inc., No. 10C3770, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 779 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 6,
2014) (discovery dispute regarding alternative funding documents).
14. See, e.g., Jonathan T. Molot, The Feasibility of Litigation Markets, 89 IND. L. J. 171, 172 73 (2014)
(describing scholarly attention directed to alternative litigation financing) (emphasis added); Nora Freeman
Engstrom, Lawyer Lending: Costs and Consequences, 63 DEPAUL L. REV. 377 (2014) (examining the lawyer
lending industry).
15. See, e.g., White Paper on Alternative Litigation Finance, A.B.A. COMM'N ON ETHICS 20/20 6 (2011),
available at http://www.americanbar.org/contenddam/aba/administrative/ethics_2020/20111019 draft alf
white-paper posting.authcheckdam.pdf (defined most generally, alternative litigation financing refers to
mechanisms that give a third-party (other than the lawyer in the case) a financial stake in the outcome in
exchange for money paid to a party in the case).
16. See, e.g., Steven Garber, Alternative Litigation Financing in the United States: Issues, Known, and
Unknowns, RAND INST. FOR CIVIL JUSTICE: LAW, FINANCE, AND CAPITAL MARKETS (2010), available at
http://www.rand.org/contenddam/rand/pubs/occasional-papers/2010/RAND-0P306.pdf.
17. See, e.g., Vanessa O'Connell, Litigation Funding Market Heats Up, WALL ST. J. BLOG (Oct. 3, 2011, 2:26
PM), http://blogs.wsj.conlaw/2011/10/03/litigation-funding-market-heats-up/.
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the litigation financing gaps, but at the center of traditional case financing,18
where plaintiffs' counsel act as litigation funders of first resort. Fourth, class
action fee and cost award doctrine itself has made major strides since Agent
Orange away from an exclusive focus on time as the yardstick for fees, creating
via the percentage method, the opportunity to value other contributions class
counsel make, including as litigation funders. And, finally, ethics doctrine has
evolved in the individual (non-class, non-aggregate) setting since Agent Orange
to chart a path to permitting direct cost profits, one that simply has not yet been
adapted to the special circumstances of the class action.1 9
Against this backdrop, this Article reexamines the ethics of cost profits in class
actions, as well as the extent to which existing doctrine points towards a measure.
The Second Circuit's decision in Agent Orange has previously been contextual-
ized 20 and criticized for failing to recognize the need for and permissibility of a
wider scope of agreements among counsel to reallocate a court's fee award.2 1
This Article grapples with the more fundamental question of whether trial courts
paying successful class counsel may make cost investment directly profitable, by,
for example, awarding a multiplier on cost investment. That inquiry traverses
three doctrinal boundary lines which, as currently drawn, fail to fully acknowl-
edge the distinct role played by plaintiffs' counsel in class actions as litigation
financiers and court-appointed fiduciaries: the lines between "professional
services" and other charges; consent and its absence; and permissible and
impermissible conflicts.
First, when class counsel acts as litigation funder, directly advancing case
costs, is he providing a professional service on which he can reasonably make a
direct profit, or is he merely paying a disbursement that is ancillary to the
18. Plaintiffs' contingency fee lawyers are typically direct litigation funders, using their own capital
buttressed by traditional bank loans to the firm. See MICHAEL J. SWANSON, How DAVID BEATS GOLIATH: ACCESS
TO CAPITAL FOR CONTINGENT-FEE LAW FIRMS 89 (2011).
19. See ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof'l Responsibility, Formal Op. 93-379 (1993) [hereinafter ABA Formal
Op. 93-379] (permitting cost profits by agreement between lawyer and client).
20. PETER H. SCHUCK, AGENT ORANGE ON TRIAL: MASS TOXIC DISASTERS IN THE COURTS 73, 94 95, 108-09,
120-22, 202 04 (1986) (describing conflicts among counsel over leadership and the related question of case
financing, and the eventual agreement among counsel for a leadership and fee allocation structure that induced
new case financing by select co-counsel); Paula Batt Wilson, Attorney Investment in Class Action Litigation:
The Agent Orange Example, 45 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 291, 311 13 (1994).
21. See, e.g., Vincent Robert Johnson, The Second Circuit Review 1986 1987 Term: Ethics: Ethical
Limitations on Creative Financing of Mass Tort Class Actions, 54 BROOK. L. REv. 539, 578 79 (1988)
(recognizing that Agent Orange highlighted the problem of how to reward cost investment in class actions, but
focusing on the ethics of agreements among counsel to reallocate fees under ethics rules prohibiting fee
splitting, rather than on the permissibility of direct cost profits); Sarah Northway, Non-Traditional Class Action
Financing and Traditional Rules of Ethics: Time for a Compromise, 14 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 241, 248 53
(2000) (characterizing agreements among counsel to reallocate fee awards to indirectly account for cost profits
as a form of non-traditional case financing, and critically evaluating the ethics of such agreements); David J.
Capra, Thomas W. Jackson & John Koeltl, Financial Arrangements in Class Actions, and the Code of
Professional Responsibility, 20 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 830, 849 54 (1993) (same).
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professional service he renders? The answer to this question largely determines
whether costs can be a profit center because ethics and class action fee and cost
award doctrine assume counsel's professional services in the form of labor are
presumptively capable of producing direct profit, but that actions that merely
support the labor function are not. While attorneys in other practice settings may
not be expected to include litigation funding as part of the package of
professional services they offer, contingent fee class counsel must, both as a
practical condition of being retained by representative plaintiffs and as a formal
matter pursuant to the criteria Rule 23 provides for appointment of class
counsel.22 The distinctiveness of contingent fee class action practice can be
recognized either by moving the boundary line between professional and other
services, or by discarding it altogether as a heuristic for defining permissible cost
profits in that setting.
Second, to what extent is client consent a necessary precursor to the award of
cost profits? Under ABA Model Rule 1.5, as interpreted by ABA Formal Opinion
93-379, cost investment may be directly profitable as long as the bases of cost
charges are disclosed to the client, preferably at the outset of litigation, and
typically in the representation agreement that commences the relationship.23 The
problem is that both Rule 1.5 and the ABA Opinion interpreting it rest on an
assumption that the lawyer-client relationship is contractual, whereas the
lawyer-client relationship in class actions is created by court order.2 4 In the class
setting, there is usually no opportunity to disclose cost profits at the outset of the
lawyer-client relationship because fee and cost awards are made ex post, after a
favorable judgment for the class has been obtained. The question is thus whether
it is possible to substitute for or simulate consent in class actions to create a space
between express individual consent and its absence. Substituting for express
consent involves shifting from a market approach to structuring the lawyer-client
relationship to a fiduciary one, a familiar move in class action jurisprudence that
is accomplished by designating the judge as guardian of the class and by giving
the court power to appoint and approve any fee and cost award to class counsel.
Simulated consent is also accomplished by the adoption of procedures to enable
class member participation, including notice, the opportunity to object to any fee
and cost award, and the right to opt out. The need for consent-or at least a
facsimile of consent-thus need not be a barrier to cost profits in class actions.
Third, do direct cost profits create conflicts between lawyer and client? The
Second Circuit expressed skepticism about directly rewarding cost investment on
that ground in Agent Orange. But the relevant question when selecting a fee and
cost award methodology is not whether the award of cost profits creates conflicts
22. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(g)(iv).
23. See MODEL RULES OF PROVL CONDUCT R. 1.5(b) (2012) [hereinafter MODEL RULES]; ABA Formal Op.
93-379, supra note 19.
24. See FED. R. Civ. P. 23(g).
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between class counsel and the class-it surely does. The relevant question is
whether, on balance, a regime that permits direct cost profits is more or less likely
to align the interests of class counsel and class members than does a regime
which does not. That analysis should consider, among other things, the
probability of conflict actually arising, the resulting costs to class members
associated with counsel's disloyalty, and the ability of courts to manage those
costs. Such a comparison of likely agency costs flowing from alternative fee and
cost award regimes indicates that the agency costs associated with direct cost
profits should be tolerated within a fee and cost award methodology.
Once over the hurdle of the propriety of cost profits in any amount, existing
doctrine points towards a measure. Courts have authority to award "reasonable"
fees and costs to successful class counsel.2 5 A key determinant of reasonableness
is the relevant "market" for legal services. Thus, the project when calculating cost
profits is to define the market. At least five options exist, explored below:
lawyer-client contracts in individual, non-class cases; rates charged by third-
party litigation funders; the market reflected by private contracts with cost-
investing counsel; the market mimicked by judges acting a consumers of legal
services; and the market for time investment. These market measures are capable
of equalizing the reward on time and cost investment to varying degrees. The
following sections explore each of these points in turn.
II. THE DISPARATE TREATMENT OF TIME AND COST INVESTMENT IN CLASS
ACTION JURISPRUDENCE; PREDICTABLE EFFECTS ON ACCESS TO JUSTICE
Entrepreneurial plaintiffs' counsel make two types of investments in class
action litigation-time and money.26 Time investment includes, literally, the
allocation of time-measured in hours-by attorneys employed by or who are
members of the firm. Most tasks cognizable as traditional "lawyering" are
accomplished via time investment, including, for example, when a lawyer
interviews clients, conducts fact discovery, drafts legal memoranda, argues in
court, conducts a trial, or settles a case.
Case-specific cost investment includes two types-in-house services and
disbursements to third parties.27 The cost investment necessary to advance class
25. See Fed. R. Civ. P 23(h).
26. The boundary between time and cost investment varies across jurisdictions and practice settings. See
Dennis E. Curtis & Judith Resnik, Contingency Fees in Mass Torts: Access, Risk, and the Provision of Legal
Services When Layers of Lawyers Work for Individuals and Collectives of Clients, 47 DEPAUL L. REv. 425,
438 39 (1998) (identifying type of work (e.g., attorney versus paralegal labor) and fee calculation method as
factors impacting the boundary between "costs" and "fees").
27. ABA Formal Op. 93-379 breaks down cost investment into three categories: Overhead is by definition
not case-specific, and instead is part of the cost of operating the business, including such items as expenses
associated with leasing office space, paying attorneys and other employees of the firm, etc. Presumptively,
overhead is recovered as part of the fee. ABA Formal Op. 93-379, supra note 19. Case-specific investments in
the form of in-house services include photocopying and messenger services provided by the firm. Id.
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actions varies by type of case, but it is the magnitude of disbursements to third
parties that distinguish these cases. 2" A kind of disbursement that is unique to
class actions is the cost of notice of class certification, which can be substantial,
especially where notice must be delivered by mail or publication to a large,
geographically dispersed class.29 Class actions can also entail extraordinary
expert costs, for example, in cases involving complex aggregate damage models,
such as antitrust suits.
30
Some tasks necessary to advance a litigation matter are nearly always
accomplished via time investment. Cases raising novel legal questions, for
example, are likely to be time-intensive, because of the amount of research,
briefing, and argument they entail. Other tasks necessary to advance class
litigation can be accomplished either via time or cost investment, including
projects where technology offers alternatives to the use of attorney labor, such as
in the area of electronic discovery, which allows firms receiving productions of
electronic data to select more or less labor-intensive review methods; where
non-lawyer legal process outsourcing companies (LPOs) are available to do the
work that would otherwise be done in the first instance by the firm's lawyers;
31
Disbursements are costs paid to third parties (outside the firm), including experts and vendors. Id.
Disbursements may also include interest charges on loans necessary to fund litigation expenses. See, e.g.,
Chittenden v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 788 So. 2d 1140, 1150 (La. 2001) (citing ethics opinions from
Florida, Maryland, Illinois, and Virginia for the proposition that interests charges may be assessed if (1) the
client agrees in writing, and (2) the rate of interest is "lawful and reasonable").
28. Recent Supreme Court decisions will increase the cost of class litigation by requiring a more rigorous
showing at the time of the motion for certification, one that in several key practice settings will front-load merits
and expert discovery and associated costs. See, e.g., Halliburton Co. v. Erica P. John Fund, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2398,
2414 15 (2014) (finding that defendants in securities fraud cases may rebut alleged price impact on market at
class certification stage); Comcast v. Behrend, 133 S. Ct. 1426, 1432 33 (2013) (criticizing lower court for
failing to recognize the importance in the class certification determination of permitting challenges to and
scrutinizing expert testimony regarding class damages); Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2551
(2011) (requiring a "rigorous analysis" of whether Rule 23's requirements have been met). See also Linda S.
Mullenix, Putting Proponents to Their Proof: Evidentiary Rules at Class Certification, 82 GEO. WASH. L. REv.
606 (2014) (suggesting pushing doctrine further, by requiring application of federal rules of evidence at the
class certification stage).
29. See Eisen v. Carlisle, 417 U.S. 156, 178 (1974) ("The usual rule is that a plaintiff must initially bear the
cost of notice to the class."); Hunt v. Imperial Merch. Servs., Inc., 560 E3d 1137, 1143 (9th Cir. 2009)
("[C]ourts must not stray too far from the principle underlying [Eisen] that the representative plaintiff should
bear all costs relating to the sending of notice because it is he who seeks to maintain the suit as a class action."
(quoting Oppenheimer Fund, Inc. v. Sanders, 437 U.S. 340, 359 (1978))).
30. See, e.g., Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304, 2316 (2013) (Kagan, J., dissenting)
("As the case comes to us, the evidence shows that Italian Colors cannot prevail in arbitration without an
economic analysis defining the relevant markets, establishing Amex's monopoly power, showing anticompeti-
tive effects, and measuring damages. And that expert report would cost between several hundred thousand and
one million dollars."); In re Fanny Mae Sec., Derivative, and ERISA Litig., No. 04-1639 (RJL), 2013 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 172231, at *61 (D.D.C. 2013) ("The most significant expense category relates to plaintiffs' experts and
consultants. Of the total reimbursement sought, $10,027,188.94, or nearly 66%, is for expert and consultant fees
and expenses.").
31. See ABA Standing Comm. on Ethics and Prof'l Responsibility, Formal Op. 08-451 (2008) (outsourced
work performed off-site without the need for law firm structural support should be billed at cost). See also
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and where either a lawyer or a non-lawyer specialist could do the same work,
such as reviewing client medical records.
Logically, it is all money investment, from the perspective of the firm serving
as class counsel on a contingent fee basis. To the owners of the firm, it costs
money to provide overhead for the firm's lawyers to be available to invest time,
and that cost can be quantified, e.g., as a cost per lawyer, per hour billed.32 The
firm typically dips into the same well of capital to pay for both overhead (which
may be recaptured only via a fee award) and case-specific cost investment
including disbursements (which are separately reimbursed as costs). But the fee
and cost award jurisprudence treats time and other cost investments differently,
and thus prompts lawyers to see the two types of investments as producing
unequal rewards.
Time investment produces two layers of direct profit. First, the lodestar (a
direct measure of lawyer time described below) is profitable because firms
typically bill their attorneys out at market rates that exceed the cost to the firm of
maintaining the lawyer whose time is being invested. Second, if the court awards
an actual or effective multiplier on lodestar, the firm realizes an additional direct
profit (the multiplied fee).33
The extent to which time investment is directly profitable depends in part on
the fee methodology used. There are two methods by which courts calculate fees
in class actions. The first method is the lodestar method, which most directly
rewards time investment. The lodestar method uses time investment as the
primary basis for calculating a fee and measuring its reasonableness. Under this
fee-calculation methodology, courts award attorneys' fees by multiplying the
number of hours the prevailing party reasonably expended on the litigation by a
reasonable hourly rate for the region and for the experience of the lawyer.34
Courts awarding fees pursuant to the lodestar method have discretion to award a
Thomas S. Clay & Eric A. Seeger, 2012 Law Firms in Transition: An Altman Weil Flash Survey, ALTMAN
WElL ii (2012), available at http://www.altmanweil.com/dir-docs/resource/1667e5c8-b99e-4557-93ac-
73174118ea29 document.pdf (forty-five and a half percent of law firm leaders surveyed in 2012 see the shift to
outsourcing of legal work as a "permanent trend," a four-fold increase over 2009 survey responses).
32. See, e.g., William F Brennan, New Survey Focuses on Law Firm Economics, 36 REP. T LEGAL MGMT. 1
(Nov./Dec. 2008), available at http://www.altmanweil.com/dir docs/resource/41ff6ad2-da67-406e-9999-
ca2aaae63539_document.pdf (reporting average per lawyer overhead expenses of $170,363 per year, based on
information provided by 265 firms contributing to the annual Altman Weil survey of law firm economics); id. at
9 (identifying staff, occupancy (e.g., leases) and paralegal expenses as the three largest cost categories
contributing to overhead); id. at 9 10 ("Note the significantly greater expense level reported by plaintiffs firms.
These firms spend more on a per lawyer basis than all other categories of firms, and their increased level of
spending applies to all expense items, but especially to paralegal, equipment, reference and promotional
expenses. The total overhead expense per lawyer for plaintiff firms is $260,761 which is a 53% premium over
the average reported by all law firms in the Survey.").
33. See In re Bluetooth Headset Prod. Liab. Litig., 654 F.3d 935, 942-43 (9th Cir. 2011) (defining lodestar
method and reversing trial court's award of a fee using the lodestar method where the trial court made no
explicit calculation of the lodestar amount, among other problems).
34. See id.
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multiplier on the lodestar in appropriate circumstances.35
The second method is the percentage method, whereby the court selects a
percentage of an ascertainable 36 common fund or common benefit to award as a
fee. 3 7 The fee ultimately awarded in a common fund case where the percentage
method is employed turns largely on the size of the fund, because any percentage
is applied to that fund. If, for example, the court awards class counsel twenty
percent of the common fund, the value of that award will depend on the size of
the fund; the question is always, "twenty percent of what?" But the selection of
the percentage figure to be applied to the common fund may depend in part on the
firm's lodestar, i.e., the firm's time investment, which courts may consider when
setting the percentage 38 or, more commonly, when cross-checking any percent-
age fee award against the lodestar to assure its reasonableness. 39 As a result,
35. The Supreme Court has expressed antagonism toward contingency multipliers in statutory fee-shifting
cases. See Burlington v. Dague, 505 U.S. 557, 562 (1992) ("We note at the outset that an enhancement for
contingency would likely duplicate in substantial part factors already subsumed in the lodestar."). Multipliers
are appropriate under fee-shifting statutes only in rare and exceptional cases. See Perdue v. Kenny A. ex rel.
Winn, 559 U.S. 542, 553 54 (2010) ("[T]here is a 'strong presumption' that the lodestar figure is reasonable, but
that presumption may be overcome in those rare circumstances in which the lodestar does not adequately take
into account a factor that may properly be considered in determining a reasonable fee."). When the lodestar
method is used to award a fee in a common fund case, the trial court generally has more discretion to award a
multiplier. See Vizcaino v. Microsoft Corp., 290 F.3d 1043, 1052 (9th Cir. 2002) ("[M]ultipliers ranging from
one to four are frequently awarded in common fund cases when the lodestar method is applied.").
36. See Hanlon v. Chrysler Corp., 150 F.3d 1011, 1029 (9th Cir. 1998) (The lodestar method should be
applied where "there is no way to gauge the net value of the settlement or any percentage thereof."); Nwabueze
v. AT&T Inc., No. C 09-01529 SI, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11766, at *5 6 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 29, 2014) (citing
Hanlon, 150 F.3d at 1029 and using lodestar method where settlement involves a claims-made program, the
ultimate value of which is not known at the time of the fee application, because the fee application predated the
conclusion of the claims program).
37. See generally In re Diet Drugs Prod. Liab. Litig., 582 F.3d 524, 540 (3d Cir. 2009) (The federal circuit
courts have adopted varying approaches to the selection of the appropriate percentage, from relying on
"benchmarks" where the project for the fee awarding court is to assess whether and on what grounds deviation
from the benchmark is warranted, to the selection of a percentage figure that depends on the circumstances of
each case, often using multifactor tests). Compare Torisi v. Tuscon Elec. Power Co., 8 E3d 1370, 1376 (9th Cir.
1993) ("In common fund cases such as this, we have established 25% of the common fund as the 'benchmark'
award for attorney fees ... . This 'benchmark percentage should be adjusted, or replaced by a lodestar
calculation, when special circumstances indicate that the percentage recovery would be either too small or too
large in light of the hours devoted to the case or other relevant factors."' (citing Six Mexican Workers v. Ariz.
Citrus Growers, 904 F.2d 1301, 1311 (9th Cir. 1990)) with In re Diet Drugs, 582 F.3d at 541) (not specifying a
benchmark, but listing ten factors to be considered by courts when selecting a percentage to apply to a common
fund).
38. See, e.g., In re Diet Drugs, 582 F.3d at 541 (identifying as one factor in the selection of the percentage to
be applied to a fund "the amount of time devoted to the case by plaintiffs' counsel"). See generally Brian T.
Fitzpatrick, Do Class Action Lawyers Make Too Little? 158 U. PA. L. REv. 2043, 2053 (2000) ("[C]ourts
typically use an indeterminate multifactor test often with the lodestar as one of the factors to select a
'reasonable' fee percentage.").
39. See In re Bluetooth Headset Prod. Liab. Litig., 654 E3d 935, 944 (9th Cir. 2011) (the Ninth Circuit has
"encouraged courts to guard against an unreasonable result by cross-checking their [percentage of fund]
calculations against a second method."); In re Rite Aid Corp. Sec. Litig., 396 F.3d 294, 301 ("The purpose of the
lodestar cross-check is to determine whether a proposed fee award is excessive relative to the hours reportedly
worked by counsel .... ); Dick v. Sprint Commc'ns Co., L.P., 297 FR.D. 283, 300 (W.D. Ky. 2014) ("Courts
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courts and class counsel in common fund cases where the percentage method is to
be applied to determine the fee are acutely aware of the lawyers' time investment,
and of the extent to which that time represents an effective multiplier.40
Time investment presents the possibility of being directly profitable in any
case in which the lodestar method will or may be used to calculate the fee. The
lodestar method must be used in statutory fee shifting cases litigated to judgment
(though a settlement, even in a statutory fee shifting case, can involve the
creation of a common fund that generates a fee using the percentage method).
Courts also regularly use the lodestar where the value of a class settlement is
difficult to ascertain, e.g., because it involves non-monetary relief or an
unfinished claims program. 41  The lodestar method may be used in most
jurisdictions even in common fund cases and is regularly used in such cases as a
cross-check even when the percentage method sets the fee.4 2
Cost investment, on the other hand, though it can be substantial,4 3 is merely
reimbursed, and produces no direct profit, regardless of the methodology used to
calculate the fee award.4 4 The standard format of an order awarding fees
calculates the fee award separately from the award of costs, noting expressly that
costs are reimbursed. While some courts have awarded less than the amount of
adopting the percentage approach generally conduct a lodestar crosscheck to ensure that counsel does not
receive a windfall."); see also Brian T. Fitzpatrick, An Empirical Study of Class Action Settlements and Their
Fee Awards, 7 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 811, 833 (2010) ("It should be noted that in 218 of these 444
settlements (49%), district courts said they considered the lodestar calculation as a factor in assessing the
reasonableness of the fee percentages awarded."); Theodore Eisenberg & Geoffrey Miller, Attorney Fees and
Expenses in Class Action Settlements, 1993 2008, 7 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 248, 267 (2010) (from
2003 2008, 42.8 percent of courts used both the percentage and lodestar methods in the same case, indicating
that these courts are undertaking a lodestar cross-check).
40. See generally infra Section II.
41. In re Bluetooth, 654 F.3d at 942.
42. See infra note 39. When the lodestar method is used as a cross-check, the value of class counsel's time
investment can drive or at least cabin the fee award made under the percentage method. See, e.g., In re Rite Aid,
396 F.3d at 306 ("The lodestar cross-check serves the purpose of alerting the trial judge that when the multiplier
is too great, the court should reconsider its calculation under the percentage-of-recovery method, with an eye
toward reducing the award.").
43. See supra note 31 and accompanying text. See also Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, Financiers as Monitors
in Aggregate Litigation, 87 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1273, 1286 87 (2012) (discussing high cost and financial risks of
aggregate litigation).
44. See, e.g., MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION § 14.216 (4th ed. 2004) (addressing "reimbursement of
expenses" as a stand-alone issue, separate and apart from questions of the fee calculation methodology).
45. See, e.g., Order Granting Award of Attorney's Fees, Reimbursement of Expenses and for Class
Representative Incentive Payments, In re Static Random Access Memory (SRAM) Antitrust Litig. (N.D. Cal.
October 14, 2011) (No. 4:07-md-1819-CW) ("IP Class Counsel are awarded attorneys' fees in the amount of
$13,744,000, which is one-third (1/3) of the settlement fund of $41,322,000 .... IP Class Counsel are awarded
reimbursement of their unreimbursed costs and expenses in the amount of $711,756.76."), at 2 3; Order
Awarding Attorneys' Fees and Expenses, In re Bank of Am. Corp. Secs., Derivative, and Emp. Ret. Income Sec.
Act (ERISA) Litig., No. 09 MDL 2058(PKC), (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 8, 2013) ("Co-Lead Counsel are hereby awarded
attorneys' fees in the amount of $152,414,235.89, plus interest on such amount at the same rate as earned by the
Settlement Fund from the date the Settlement Fund was funded to the date of payment, which sum the Court
finds to be fair and reasonable, and $8,069,985.04 in reimbursement of Litigation Expenses, which fees and
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reimbursement sought, e.g., on the ground that the costs submitted were
46 oteris7insufficiently documented, or were otherwise excessive, courts do not award
a direct mark-up on costs, either by permitting counsel to charge more than the
costs actually incurred, or by awarding a multiplier on such costs.
Cost-investment may be indirectly profitable. While in the typical case,
cost-investment is not determinative of the fee, it is indirectly profitable to the
extent it makes a favorable judgment more likely, and some courts identify it as
one, indeterminately weighted factor characterizing the contingency risk counsel
undertook.48 The degree of that risk may have an effect on the fee via a lodestar
multiplier when the lodestar method is used,4 9 or when the court selects a
contingency percentage under the percentage of fund method.50 Court decisions
do not explain the precise connection between cost investment and any fee, and,
in any event, merely reimburse such cost investment.5 1 Moreover, courts
expenses shall be paid to Co-Lead Counsel from the Settlement Fund."), available at http://www.blbglaw.com/
cases/00120 data/OrderAwardingFees.
46. See, e.g., Physician of Winter Haven LLC v. Steris Corp., No. 1:10 CV 264, 2012 WL 406966, at *9
(N.D. Ohio Feb. 6, 2012) (denying copy and computer charges due to lack of adequate information about the
charges); In re Austrian and German Bank Holocaust Litig., No. 98 Civ. 3938(SWK), 2003 WL 402795
(S.D.N.Y. Feb. 21, 2003) (denying costs for historical research due to lack of information establishing necessity
of the research).
47. See, e.g., In re Agent Orange Prod. Liab. Litig., 611 F. Supp. 1296, 1359 (E.D.N.Y. 1985) (denying as
excessive charges for unreasonably expensive hotel accommodations and meals).
48. See Macey & Miller, supra note 11, at 52 53 ("Most jurisdictions accept risk as a factor for
consideration, but the determination of the level of risk is done exceedingly impressionistically.").
49. DeHoyos v. Allstate Corp., 240 FR.D. 269, 330 (W.D. Tex. 2007) ("Given the complex legal and factual
issues confronting counsel, as discussed throughout this opinion, class counsel undertook a considerable risk
with no guarantee any fees or expenses would be recovered."); In re Sumitomo Copper Litig., 74 F Supp. 2d
393, 399-400 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (grounding 2.5 multiplier on time in part on counsel's contingency risk
associated with $1.8 million in case-specific cost investment over a ten year period).
50. See, e.g., In re Toyota Motor Corp. Unintended Acceleration Mktg., Sales Practices, & Prod. Liab. Litig.,
No. 8:1OML 02151 JVS (FMOx), 2013 US Dist. LEXIS 123298, at *306,*308 09 (C.D. Cal. July 24, 2013)
(tentatively approving $200 million fee request on class settlement valued by settlement proponents at $1.6
billion, examining fee request using percentage of fund with a lodestar cross-check, and noting that with the
lodestar of $69,706,936, the multiplier on time was 2.87; the court mentioned class counsel's contingent cost
investment of $30,606,117, noting that plaintiffs' expert had found only one case in a survey of 688 cases with a
higher absolute dollar amount of costs advanced); see Kifafi v. Hilton Hotels Ret. Plan, 999 F Supp. 2d 88,
100-103 (D.D.C. 2013) (noting costs advanced as a factor contributing to class counsel's contingency risk, one
factor affecting the selection of the percentage to be applied to a common fund to calculate class counsel's fee;
reimbursing costs).
51. If the court uses a pure percentage-of-recovery method for calculating the fee, then time investment and
cost investment are on more equal footing in that both have the potential to be only indirectly profitable. See
MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION, supra note 44, at 193 ("Unlike a statutory-fee analysis, where the lodestar is
generally determinative, a percentage-fee award sometimes gives little weight to the amount of time
expended."). But even in that setting, cost investment, though mentioned in passing, is rarely if ever given the
kind of attention time investment receives in percentage-of-fund fee orders. See, e.g., In re Colgate-Palmolive
Co. ERISA Litig., No. 07-cv-9515, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 93379 (S.D.N.Y. July 8, 2014) (in a $45.9 million
class action settlement, in which class counsel successfully moved for a twenty-five percent fee and for cost
reimbursement in the amount of $591,011.17, including approximately $490,000 in expert fees paid out of
pocket, the court, considering counsel's contingency risk, mentioned only the risk of not being compensated or
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considering the contingency risk do not typically highlight cost investment and
instead focus on the riskiness of the claims, i.e., the possibility of not
prevailing. 2
Review of a recent fee and cost award serves to crystalize the foregoing
analysis: In In re Payment Card Interchange Fee & Merch. Disc. Antitrust
Litig., 3 Judge Gleeson, of the Eastern District of New York, oversaw a
settlement of claims by merchants that Visa, MasterCard and a number of banks
conspired to fix credit card fees and rules in violation of the antitrust statutes. The
class action settlement's two key features were a $7.25 billion fund and
additional injunctive relief in the form of credit card network rules changes.5 4 At
the outset of its opinion awarding $544.8 million in attorneys' fees and
$27,037,716.97 in costs, the trial court held:
Class Counsel took on serious risks in prosecuting the case. They now represent
that, taking together all of the hours that they and other plaintiffs' counsel billed
on this case, the lodestar figure for attorneys' fees is approximately $160
million, reflecting almost 500,000 hours of attorney and paralegal work
conducted through November 30, 2012. s s
The court thus grounded its fee award on class counsel's time investment,
even though the award was made using the percentage of fund method, with
the lodestar method used merely as a cross-check on the reasonableness of the
award.56 The court could have justified that time-centric focus using the
first-listed criterion for establishing a percentage fee under the relevant Second
paid a fee, without specifically mentioning counsel's cost investment other than to note, in a separate section of
the order that costs were being reimbursed); Boyd v. Coventry Health Care Inc., 299 FR.D. 451, 462-464, 468
(D. Md. 2014) (considering "the risk of nonpayment" as a factor in determining the percentage fee award, but
omitting reference to costs advanced as part of the analysis of that factor, even though cost investment in this
one case was approximately ten percent of time investment, i.e., approximately $137,000). That inequality can
be explained in part by the fact that time investment dwarfs cost investment in the typical class case. See
Eisenberg & Miller, supra note 42, at 274 ("Costs and expenses (collectively 'costs') tended to be a small
percentage of the class recovery and have remained a fairly constant percentage over time. For the 232 cases
from 1993 to 2002 for which cost data were available, mean costs were 2.8 percent of the recovery and median
costs were 1.7 percent.").
52. See, e.g., Thayer v. Wells Fargo Bank, 92 Cal. App. 4th 819, 834 (2001) (defining the contingency risk in
a lodestar case as "the contingent nature of the fee award, both from the point of view of eventual victory on the
merits and the point of view of establishing eligibility for an award" (quoting Serrano v. Priest, 20 Cal.3d 25, 49
(Cal. 1977))). But see Iorio v. Allianz Life Ins. Co. of N. Am., No. 05-CV-0633-JLS (CAB), 2011 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 21824, at *34 (S.D. Ca. Mar. 3, 2011) (awarding an $18 million fee and $1.3 million in costs, the court
noted: "Class counsel's ability to recover fees and expenses in this action was purely contingent upon a
successful outcome or settlement").
53. See In re Payment Card Interchange Fee & Merch. Disc. Antitrust Litig., 991 E Supp. 2d 437
(E.D.N.Y.2014).
54. Id. at 439 (opt-outs reduced the cash fund to $5.7 billion).
55. Id.
56. Id. at 440.
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Circuit precedent, i.e., "the time and labor expended by counsel. 5 7 Instead, the
trial court focused primarily on another one of the listed criteria, i.e., "the risk of
the litigation." In a case involving such substantial cost investment by class
counsel, one would think that an assessment of the risk counsel undertook would
emphasize that category of investment. Instead, the court held:
This case was unusually risky for a number of reasons .... Those risks could
have meant the end of the litigation with no recovery for class members and no
fee for counsel. Counsel should be rewarded for undertaking them and for
achieving substantial value for the class. If not for the attorneys' willingness to
endure for many years the risk that their extraordinary efforts would go
uncompensated, the settlement would not exist.
58
While the court noted in passing that the litigation was "expensive, 5 9 the
expense with which it appears to have been most concerned for purposes of
analyzing class counsel's contingency risk was time advanced. The trial court
used the lodestar cross-check to find that the percentage fee award amounted to
an effective multiplier on time of 3.41, which it held was "comparable to
multipliers in other large, complex cases." As to counsel's roughly $27 million in
cost investment, the court held, in a short section of the fee and cost award order
titled "Expenses," that "[a]s a general rule, counsel are entitled to reimbursement
for reasonable out-of-pocket expenses incurred over the course of litigating the
case." 60 The disproportionate focus on time versus cost investment as a
justification for the fee award renders this decision typical.6 1
Professor Rubenstein and I have shown that disproportionately rewarding time
relative to cost investment distorts attorney case investment decisions in a
manner that can dramatically affect whether persons with high cost claims have
57. Id. (citing Goldberger v. Integrated Res., Inc., 209 F.3d 43, 50 (2d Cir. 2000)).
58. Id. at 441 (emphasis added).
59. Id. ("My award of attorneys' fees must recognize that, from an ex ante perspective, counsel no doubt had
serious doubts about taking on such a risky and expensive litigation.").
60. Id. at 448.
61. See, e.g., In re Citigroup Inc. Bond Litig., 988 F. Supp. 2d 371, 373 376, 378 381 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (In
connection with the settlement of a securities fraud class action, the trial court awarded $116.8 million in fees
and reimbursed litigation expenses in the amount of $7,286,868; using the percentage of fund method with a
lodestar cross-check, the court assessed the reasonableness of the fee award by reference to time invested,
without emphasizing cost investment as a determinant of the award, instead, merely noting that costs are to be
reimbursed); In re Schering-Plough Corp. Enhance Secs. Litig., No. 08-397 (DMC) (JAD), 2013 U.S. Dist
LEXIS 147981, at *74 115 (D. N.J. Aug. 28, 2013) (In connection with settlement of a securities fraud class
action, awarding $80,021,600 in fees and $3,620,049.63 in costs, using a blended percentage and lodestar
method, noting substantial cost investment, but disproportionately emphasizing time investment, both in
connection with the percentage to be applied to the settlement fund and via the lodestar cross-check); In re
Flonase Antitrust Litig., 951 F. Supp. 2d 739, 746 51 (E.D. Pa. 2013) (In connection with settlement involving
creation of a $150 million settlement fund, court awarded fees of $50 million and reimbursed costs in the
amount of $2,069,433, focusing in the order on fees almost exclusively on time investment using both the
percentage and lodestar methods).
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access to quality representation.62 If we assume that class counsel are profit-
maximizing, then mapping the distortions is a matter of following the money.
While a plaintiffs' class action law firm may be indifferent to the distinction
between time and cost investment, it can experience direct profits only on time,
not costs. As a result, the firm will favor time-intensive over cost-intensive cases
when choosing which cases to pursue; when given a choice, will invest attorney
time rather than costs in a case, even if paying a third-party to perform a
necessary litigation task would be cheaper for the class; and will face relatively
more pressure to settle prematurely, especially around major cost-investment
points, e.g., just before having to invest in high cost testifying experts. The
distortion in class counsel's investment incentives caused by the current bias
against direct cost profits thus produces agency costs, including the loss in
welfare experienced by the principal as a result of counsel's disloyalty.
6 3
The disparate treatment of time and cost investment in class action fee doctrine
is rarely challenged. Class counsel do not normally seek direct cost profits from
the court. This state of affairs is widely and uncritically accepted. The strain of
mismatched rewards on time and cost investment is mostly under the surface,
invisible to outside observers, except where investing counsel disagree on the
allocation of any fee and cost award. In many cases, counsel's investment of time
and cost are roughly proportional, so that the fee awarded gets allocated in
roughly the same percentage as the overall contribution of time and money.
However, in some cases, counsel invest time and costs disproportionately. It is in
those cases that the uneven treatment of time and cost investment is most likely to
erupt in the kind of conflict that will bubble up to a published decision that
reveals the ethical concerns animating the uneven treatment of time and cost
investment.
Agent Orange is the most famous case.6 4 There, at a critical juncture in the
litigation, existing counsel had depleted their resources and needed additional
cost investment to continue the litigation. 65 To induce such investment, Plaintiffs'
Management Committee (PMC) members agreed that cash-investing counsel
would receive a three-fold return on their cost investment in the event of a
62. Ratner & Rubenstein, supra note 6, at 600-07. In this analysis, we assumed the lawyers are profit
maximizing on behalf of their firms, that they can predict case costs and case expected values with some
accuracy, and that they are indifferent between time and cost investment but for the way courts reward those
categories of investment. See id. at 598 99.
63. For a classic definition of agency costs, see Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the
Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 308 (1976).
64. Interfirm agreements regarding case financing are common. See Nora Freeman Engstrom, Re-Re-
Financing Civil Litigation: How Lawyer Lending Might Remake the American Litigation Landscape, Again, 61
UCLA L. REv. Disc. 110, 115 (2013) ("Nor has interfirm coordination been confined to marquee cases. Even in
routine cases, a practice has developed whereby, when PI law firms become over-extended, they forge
co-counsel relationships with better financed and more experienced lawyers, together shepherding difficult
cases to trial.").
65. SCHUCK, supra note 20, at 102 09 (describing the plaintiffs' lawyers' financial crisis).
2015]
THE GEORGETOWN JOURNAL OF LEGAL ETHICS [Vol. 28:271
successful resolution of the case.66 Fees remaining in the pool (the combined fee
and cost award made by the court) after the investment payouts would be split in
accordance with counsel's relative time investments.6 7 Judge Weinstein, recogniz-
ing the need to properly reward cost investing counsel, was willing to tolerate this
reallocation of his fee and cost award. 68 The Second Circuit reversed on grounds
sounding in ethics and procedure: 69 Class counsel's contractual end-run around
the court's fee and cost award conflicted with the "principles of reasonable
compensation in common fund actions" set forth in Second Circuit cases, which
at that time centered on counsel's relative time investment via the lodestar
method. 7 0 Moreover, the agreement among counsel to reward cost-investment
created impermissible conflicts between class counsel and the class because
cost-investing counsel were focused primarily on their three-fold return rather
than on maximizing the recovery for the class. 71 Not only was the particular
allocation agreement among counsel in that case unenforceable, but, the court
suggested that all agreements designed to generate cost profits categorically
created unacceptable risks of disloyalty:
In our view, fees that include a return on investment present the clear potential
for a conflict of interest between class counsel and those whom they have
undertaken to represent .... The conflict obviously lies in the incentive
provided to an investor-attorney to settle early and thereby avoid work for
which full payment may not be authorized by the district court. Moreover, as
soon as an offer of settlement to cover the promised return on investment [i.e.,
cost investment] is made, the investor-attorney will be disinclined to undertake
the risks associated with continuing the litigation.7 2
66. In re Agent Orange Prod. Liab. Litig., 818 F.2d 216, 218 (2d Cir. 1987).
67. Id. at 219.
68. Id. at 220 21.
69. Id. at 222 (When reviewing a fee issue, "courts should look to the various codes of ethics as guidelines
for judging the conduct of counsel .... The ultimate inquiry, therefore, in examining fee agreements and setting
fee awards under the equitable fund doctrine and FED. R. Civ. P. 23(e) is the effect an agreement could have on
the rights of a class.").
70. Id. at 223 ("A careful examination of those decisions permitting internal fee sharing agreements to
govern the distribution of fees reveals no case where return on investment was a factor. More important, in a
number of those cases the courts apparently assumed that the internal fee sharing agreement would be based
substantially on services rendered by individual counsel .... Obviously, the needs of large class litigation may
at times require class counsel in assessing the relative value of an individual attorney's contribution to turn to
factors more subjective than a mere hourly fee analysis. It does mean that the distribution of fees must bear some
relationship to services rendered.").
71. Id. at 224 ("The district court recognized that the agreement provided an incentive for the PMC to accept
an early settlement offer not in the best interests of the class, because 'an attorney who is promised a multiple of
funds advanced will receive the same return whether the case is settled today or five years from now,' (quoting
In re Agent Orange Prod. Liab. Litig., 611 F.Supp. 1296, 1460 (E.D.N.Y. 1985))).
72. Id. at 223 24 (citations omitted).
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Though academic commentators criticized the Agent Orange decision in the
few years following its issuance, 7 3 it remains good law.
74
III. THE ETHICS OF COST PROFITS
Agent Orange should not be the last word on the ethics of cost profits. Because
of the way the relevant doctrine is structured, a modern inquiry into the ethical
propriety of direct cost profits requires us to map three boundary lines-the lines
between professional and other services, between consent and its absence, and
between permissible and impermissible conflicts. Traditionally, these lines have
been drawn as a barrier to cost profits, due largely to a failure to fully account for
class counsel's unique role as litigation funder and as a court-appointed fiduciary.
A. THE LINE BETWEEN PROFESSIONAL AND "OTHER" SERVICES
Ethics rules, contract law (as applied to attorney fee and cost agreements), and
class action fee and cost award doctrine all presume that attorney "services" may
be directly profitable, but that cost investment may not, absent notice or
agreement to the contrary at the outset of the attorney-client relationship. These
doctrines constitute a line between "professional" (attorney labor) and other
services, one that has been used to bar direct cost profits in class actions. Direct
cost profits can be enabled in part by updating our vision of the professional
service that lawyers provide in practice settings where they act as litigation
funders of first resort.
1. THE BOUNDARY LINE'S CONSTITUTIVE DOCTRINE
Under Rule 1.5 of the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct, time
investment is presumptively profitable, but cost investment is not. Rule 1.5
imposes the same general limits on fees and costs, i.e., both must be reasonable.7 5
The Rule also requires similarly timed disclosures to the client of both fees and
costs, i.e., at the outset of an attorney-client relationship.7 6 The similarities end
there. While Rule 1.5(a) provides a detailed multi-factor test for assessing the
73. See supra note 21.
74. See, e.g., In re TFT-LCD (Flat Panel) Antitrust Litig., No. M 07-1827 SI, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 49885,
at *84 (N.D. Cal. April 1, 2013) ("Both federal law and California law require that any fee allocation agreement
among attorneys that are not members of the same firm be in writing and signed by the clients, and be made in
proportion to the services performed and responsibilities assumed," (citing Agent Orange, 818 F.2d at 220));
Allapattah Servs. v. Exxon Corp., 454 E Supp. 2d 1185, 1225 26 (S.D. Fla. 2006) (rejecting fee allocation
agreement among class counsel and citing Agent Orange).
75. MODEL RULES R. 1.5(a) ("A lawyer shall not make an agreement for, charge, or collect an unreasonable
fee or an unreasonable amount for expenses.").
76. MODEL RULES R. 1.5(b) ("The scope of the representation and the basis or rate of the fee and expenses for
which the client will be responsible shall be communicated to the client, preferably in writing, before or within a
reasonable time after commencing the representation ... ").
2015]
THE GEORGETOWN JOURNAL OF LEGAL ETHICS [Vol. 28:271
reasonableness of a fee,77 neither the rule nor the comments to it explain what
constitutes a "reasonable" cost charge, except that Comment 1 suggests that
absent agreement to the contrary, the cost of "services performed in-house" must
reflect the actual "cost incurred by the lawyer," meaning there can be no markup
or profit on such cost investment. 78 The leading ethics opinion on billing
practices extends Comment l's presumption to the other key category of
case-specific costs, i.e., disbursements: "It is the view of the Committee that, in
the absence of disclosure to the contrary, it would be improper if the lawyer
assessed a surcharge on these disbursements over and above the amount actually
incurred unless the lawyer herself incurred additional expenses beyond the actual
cost of the disbursement item.",79 Only cost investment is subject to this
presumptive preclusion of profits.
This differential treatment of time and cost investment under the ethics rules
reflects a particular understanding of the line between "professional" and "other"
services. The line is revealed in ABA Formal Op. 93-379, which treats attorney
time and "professional services" as synonymous,80 and, moreover, assumes that
attorney cost investment is not part of the "professional" service rendered.81 The
justification for this boundary line is based on a vision of the professional role
grounded in labor:
"[I]n the absence of agreement to the contrary, it is impermissible for a lawyer
to create an additional source of profit for the law firm beyond that which is
contained in the provision of professional services themselves. The lawyer's
stock in trade is the sale of legal services, not photocopy paper, tuna fish
sandwiches, computer time or messenger services."
82
77. MODEL RULES R. 1.5(a) lists eight non-exclusive factors for determining the reasonableness of a "fee,"
including, first, the "time and labor required," as well as the lawyer's opportunity costs; customary fees in the
locality; the amount involved and results obtained; time limits imposed by the client or circumstances; the
nature of the lawyer's prior relationship with the client; the lawyer's experience or reputation; and whether
the fee is fixed or contingent.
78. ABA Formal Op. 93-379 explains how actual costs of in-house services may be calculated: "We
conclude that under those circumstances the lawyer is obliged to charge the client no more than the direct cost
associated with the service (i.e., the actual cost of making a copy on the photocopy machine) plus a reasonable
allocation of overhead expenses directly associated with the provision of the service (e.g., the salary of the
machine operator)." ABA Formal Op. 93-379, supra note 19.
79. Id. (commenting that law firm overhead is subsumed within the charge for professional services, and,
absent agreement to the contrary, cannot be billed separately at all; case-specific cost investment (either in the
form of disbursements or charges for in-house services can be recouped, but only at cost)).
80. Id. ("Consistent with the Model Rules of Professional Conduct, a lawyer must disclose to a client the
basis on which the client is to be billed for both professional time and any other charges. Absent a contrary
understanding, any invoice for professional services should fairly reflect the basis on which the client's charges
have been determined.").
81. Id. ("In addition to charging clients fees for professional services, lawyers typically charge their clients
for certain additional items which are often referred to as disbursements, out-of-pocket expenses or additional
charges.").
82. Id. (emphasis added). The ABA's interpretation of Rule 1.5 as it applies to the billing of time by contract
lawyers is similarly revealing. A firm employing contract lawyers may elect to treat them either as a
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The boundary between professional and other services corresponds with a
differential treatment of time and cost investment under contract law as well. A
lawyer may earn a profit on time investment in litigation even if the lawyer and
client never reach agreement on the proper basis for calculating that fee, or, put
differently, even if the lawyer and client never agree on the amount of profit the
lawyer can earn on time investment.8 3 In the absence of an agreement regarding
fees, courts will typically award fees on a quantum meruit basis, 4 at the lower
range of what would be a reasonable negotiated fee,85 which can be determined
based on an hourly rate that would be charged by lawyers of similar experience in
comparable cases.8 6 Thus, the fee awarded may not be as profitable as the fee the
attorney would have liked to have negotiated, but may nevertheless incorporate
some level of profit, i.e., a markup on the actual cost to the lawyer of providing
the time investment. 87 The same is not true of costs. Paralleling ethics doctrine,
cost investment by a lawyer cannot be directly profitable absent agreement to the
contrary.
disbursement, in which case the cost is not presumptively profitable, or as the provision of a legal service, in
which case it is presumptively profitable. See ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof'l Responsibility, Formal Op.
00-420 (2000) [hereinafter ABA Formal Op. 00-420].
83. GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR., W. WILLIAM HODES & PETER R. JARVIS, THE LAW OF LAWYERING 8 24, § 8.10
(3d ed. 2012), ("[lt is rare that a client-lawyer relationship comes into being, let alone continues, without some
agreement even if only an implicit one about the fees that the lawyer will charge. However, the matter may
have been left so vague that for practical purposes there is no 'agreement' that is capable of being enforced
according to its 'terms.' Also, there are situations in which the parties thought they had an agreement, but the
agreement is unenforceable because of some technical impediment.").
84. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS, § 39 [hereinafter RESTATEMENT] ("If a client
and lawyer have not made a valid contract providing for another measure of compensation, a client owes a
lawyer who has performed legal services for the client the fair value of the lawyer's services."); Joseph M.
Perillo, The Law of Lawyers'Contracts is Different, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 443,452 (1998) ("Putting disciplinary
consequences aside, the lawyer who fails to comply with this requirement [of Model Rule 1.5(b)] will be
relegated to compensation on the basis of quantum meruit.") (bracketed text added).
85. RESTATEMENT § 39 cmt. c ("A conservative evaluation is usually appropriate in assessing fees under this
Section. When a lawyer fails to agree with the client in advance on the fee to be charged, the client should not
have to pay as much as some clients might have agreed to pay.").
86. RESTATEMENT § 39 cmt. c ("The hourly fee would be that charged by lawyers of similar experience and
other credentials in comparable cases, but not more than the standard rate of the lawyer in question for that type
of work."); Mardirossian & Assocs., Inc. v. Ersoff, 153 Cal. App. 4th 257, 272 (2007) ("It is well settled that a
contingency fee lawyer discharged prior to settlement may recover in quantum meruit for the reasonable value
of services rendered up to the time of discharge. 'The most useful starting point for determining the amount of a
reasonable fee is the number of hours reasonably expended on the litigation multiplied by a reasonable hourly
rate. ') (internal citations omitted); Potts v. Hines, 534 N.Y.S.2d 507, 508 (N.Y. App. Div. 1988) ("A suspended
attorney is entitled to recover on a quantum meruit basis for services performed prior to suspension (22 NYCRR
806.9[b]). Generally, an attorney seeking counsel fees must establish the value of his services ... by showing
such factors as the time and skill required, the matter's complexity, his experience, ability and reputation, the
client's benefit from the services and the fee usually charged by other attorneys for similar services.").
87. See HAZARD ET AL., supra note 83, at 8 25 ("[I]n measuring the fair value, a court should take into
account the market price for like service"); RESTATEMENT § 39 cmt. c ("A lawyer who proves that a standard fee
exists in the area should ordinarily be entitled to receive it... ").
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Class action fee and cost awards also track the ethics rules' distinction between
professional services that presumptively may generate profit and other services
(including cost investment) that may not. As noted, most fee and cost awards
state that cost advances are merely reimbursed, without explanation.88 But a few
decisions do discuss their refusal to permit direct cost profits, and those decisions
either cite ethics doctrine (as in Agent Orange), or use language that tracks the
key boundary line between professional and other services.89
2. WHY COST INVESTMENT IS EXCLUDED FROM THE DEFINITION OF "PROFESSIONAL
SERVICES"
The current boundary line between "professional" and other services reflects
a particular understanding of client expectations. ABA Formal Op. 93-379
("the Opinion") states that surcharges or direct profits on disbursements beyond
the actual cost advanced by the lawyer are impermissible, absent agreement
to the contrary because "[c]lients quite properly could view these practices as an
attempt to create additional undisclosed profit centers when the client has been
told he would be billed for disbursements." 90 This view of client expectations
results in part from the assumption in the Opinion that the lawyer has committed
in advance to "bill" for disbursements. 91 But the same set of default assumptions
is not applied to labor or time; a lawyer who promises, ex ante, to "bill" for time
is not assumed to be billing only at the lawyer's cost of providing the legal
service, without room for profit.
92
The source of this understanding of client expectations regarding the
profitability of professional versus "other" services like advancing costs is
unclear.93 It is likely that the drafters of the Opinion simply did not have
contingency fee lawyers in mind when describing client expectations.94 For
88. See In re Payment Card Interchange Fee & Merch. Disc. Antitrust Litig., 991 F. Supp. 2d 437, 448
(E.D.N.Y.2014).
89. See, e.g., In re San Juan Dupont Plaza Hotel Fire Litig., 111 E3d 220, 237 n. 19 (lst Cir. 1997) (citing and
discussing ABA Formal Op. 93-379 when refusing to permit copy charges to become a profit center for common
benefit counsel in an aggregate MDL proceeding); In re AMF Bowling Sec. Litig., 334 E Supp. 2d 462, 469 70
(S.D.N.Y. 2004) (citing and discussing ABA Formal Op. 93-379 when rejecting cost submission in class action
that contained insufficient detail for the court to determine if it included impermissible profits on costs).
90. ABA Formal Op. 93-379, supra note 19.
91. Id.
92. See ABA Formal Op. 00-420, supra note 82 ("It is implicit in Formal Op. 93-379 that profit from
providing legal services is expected and appropriate, as long as the total fee is reasonable.").
93. The Opinion's view of client expectations is somewhat circular, given that ethics rules (and their
interpretation) shape those same expectations.
94. It is possible, too, that the exclusion of cost investment from the definition of professional services that
may presumptively be profitable results from the fact that, in some jurisdictions, funds advanced for case costs
are ultimately the client's responsibility. See Geoffrey P. Miller, Payment of Expenses in Securities Class
Actions: Ethical Dilemmas, Class Counsel, and Congressional Intent, 22 REv. LITIG. 557, 565 73 (2003)
(reviewing increasingly permissive approaches in ethics rules toward attorney advances to clients, and
describing jurisdictions' varying approaches to the question of whether clients must ultimately be responsible
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purposes of identifying and drawing the boundary line between professional and
other services, the Opinion imagines the lawyer as billing for time and costs on a
pay-as-you-go basis. The first sentence of the Opinion reiterates the requirement
that a lawyer disclose the basis on which the client is to be "billed for both
professional time and any other charges. 95 The second sentence of the Opinion
assumes that such billing occurs in the form of "invoices for professional
services. 96 Despite the increasing prevalence of alternative fee arrangements
(e.g., flat fees), this traditional vision of the lawyer who regularly invoices and
collects time and cost charges from the client accurately reflects a large segment
of the legal services market.
97
Contingent fee lawyers in general, and plaintiffs' class action lawyers in
particular, are different. In lieu of billing or invoicing clients for time and costs on
a pay-as-you-go basis, such lawyers invest time and costs in their clients' claims
in exchange for payment out of any recovery only in the event that the litigation is
successful.9 8 The Opinion mentions contingent fee lawyers in passing, when
quoting the text of Rule 1.5,99 and when limiting the lawyer's ability to charge for
overhead costs which are deemed part of the fee and are thus different from
case-specific costs like in-house charges or disbursements to third parties.100 But
the Opinion omits any meaningful description of the case investment that
contingency fee lawyers make.
Historical bias may also explain the current border between professional and
other services. Disdain for or at least minimization of the centrality of litigation
funding as a component of the array of professional services lawyers may provide
has deep historical roots. It was expressed most clearly in common law
prohibitions against that function-maintenance, champerty, and barratry, doc-
trines that have been traced back to feudal England.10O "Put simply, maintenance
for costs advanced). That means the lawyer is not seen as taking a risk there equivalent to the risk associated
with the lawyer's advance of time, recovery of which may, in all jurisdictions, be purely contingent on the case
outcome.
95. ABAFormal Op. 93-379, supra note 19.
96. Id.
97. David Brown & Jennifer Tonti, Executive Summary: Survey of Law Firm Economics, MANAGING
PARTNER FORUM 3 (2012), available at http://www.managingpartnerforum.org/tasks/sites/mpf/assets/image/
MPF%20-%202012%2OSurvey%20of%20LF%2OEconomics%20-%2OExec%2OSummary%20-%209-20-
12.pdf_("[W]hile it's clear that alternative fee arrangements are part of the arsenal of the vast majority of firms
(ninety-six percent said one or more of their billings came from alternative fees), that doesn't mean firms are fast
replacing the billable hour. Last year, thirty percent of firms said alternative fees represented more than ten
percent of their billings. This year, thirty-four percent said so. The needle is moving but slowly.").
98. HERBERT M. KRITZER, RISKS, REPUTATIONS AND REWARDS: CONTINGENCY FEE LEGAL PRACTICE IN THE
UNITED STATES 9 (2004) (defining contingency fee agreements).
99. Id. at 7.
100. Id. at 5.
101. Max Radin, Maintenance by Champerty, 24 CALIF. L. REv. 48, 63 64 (1935); see also Deborah L.
Rhode, Institutionalizing Ethics, 44 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 665, 722 23 (1994) (linking restrictions  case
financing both by lawyers and by parties to medieval prohibitions on champerty and maintenance); Miller,
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is helping another prosecute a suit; champerty is maintaining a suit in return for a
financial interest in the outcome; and barratry is a continuing practice of
maintenance or champerty." 10 2 These doctrines arose out of a cultural back-
ground in which litigation was viewed not as an essential mode of (private)
enforcement of law, but, instead, as a "necessary evil," 10 3 such that the lawyer's
legitimate role was not framed to include creating the conditions necessary for
litigation to be most conveniently, widely, or fairly financed. The role of the
lawyer was instead to be an advisor and counselor, with the value of the service
measured in units of time.
That vision was challenged in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries by
competing conceptions of contingency fee lawyers as performing a social
good-enabling private enforcement of law. 104 In the United States, champerty
and maintenance are now relatively weak doctrines. 10 5 They were never
universally adopted in this country, and have increasingly fallen into disfavor. 106
With regard to contingency fees in particular, maintenance, champerty, and
barratry have ceded ground to ethics rules 10 7 that regulate10 8 but permit such fees
in every jurisdiction.10 9 But the anxiety regarding litigation financing expressed
supra note 94, at 560461 (linking ethics rules regarding advancement of litigation costs to "traditional concerns
about maintenance and champerty").
102. In re Edna Smith Primus, 436 U.S. 412, 424 n.15 (1978) (citing 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE,
COMMENTARIES, * 134 36).
103. Radin, supra note 101, at 68.
104. See Peter Karsten, Enabling the Poor to Have Their Day in Court: The Sanctioning of Contingency Fee
Contracts, a History to 1940, 47 DEPAUL L. REV. 231, 241-42 (1998); In re Abrams & Abrams, P.A., 605 F.3d
238, 245 (4th Cir. 2010) ("[C]ontingeny fees provide access to counsel for individuals who would otherwise
have difficulty obtaining representation."). But see Anthony J. Sebok, The Inauthentic Claim, 64 VAND. L. REV.
61, 125 (2011) (challenging the historical account of a "straight line of hostility" to maintenance and champerty
extending "from Rome until the late twentieth century").
105. See Del Webb Cmtys., Inc. v. Partington, 652 F.3d 1145, 1156 (9th Cir. 2011) (recognizing the decline
of champerty as a tort).
106. See Saladini v. Righellis, 687 N.E.2d 1224, 1225 26 (Mass. 1997) (The doctrine of Champerty "has a
long and, in this country, checkered history... . The extent to which courts, here, accepted the doctrine has
varied .... In some States, champerty was never adopted, or has been abandoned .... In others, the doctrine
was given narrow application. See, e.g., Brown v. Bigne, 28 P. 11,13 (Or. 1891) (doctrine should apply only
when 'contracts are made for the purpose of stirring up strife and litigation, harassing others, inducing suits to be
begun which otherwise would not have been commenced, or for speculation.").
107. See Sebok, supra note 104, at 100 (the contingency fee is a form of maintenance now regulated by
"each state's rules regarding the regulation of lawyers").
108. See MODEL RULES R. 1.5 (prohibiting contingency fees in particular categories of suits); Monica
Hughes, Note, Applying State Contingency Fee Caps in Multidistrict Litigation (MDL) Settlements, 91 TEX. L.
REV. 961, 963 (2013) ("Several state laws broadly cap contingency fees in most kinds of tort suits."); Richard W.
Painter, Litigating on a Contingency: A Monopoly of Champions or a Market for Champterty?, 71 CHI.-KENT L.
REV. 625, 648 (1995) ("In addition to determining reasonableness on a case-by-case basis, some jurisdictions
limit contingent-fee percentages by rules of court. A few federal statutes impose similar limits.").
109. See MODEL RULES R. 1.5(a)(8) & R. 1.8(e) (2013); MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY DR
2-106(B)(8) (1980) [hereinafter MODEL CODE]; CANONS OF PROVL ETHICS Canon 12 (1908) [hereinafter 1908
CANONS]; Lester Brickman, Contingent Fees Without Contingencies: Hamlet Without the Prince of Denmark?,
37 UCLA L. REv. 29, 38 39 (1989) ("Today, all fifty states allow attorneys to enter into contingent fee
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in the doctrines of maintenance, champerty, and barratry still exists 1 0 and shapes
the law governing lawyers. For example, that fear still animates limits on
third-party financing in some jurisdictions,1 1 and shapes Model Rules 1.8(e),
limiting the ability of lawyers to provide financial assistance to clients, and 1.8(i),
preventing lawyers from acquiring property interests in a cause of action other
than a contingent fee or cost recovery. 
1 1 2
It is only by ignoring or downplaying the distinct role class counsel plays as
litigation funder that an expectations-based bifurcation of services into "profes-
sional" (time) and "other" (costs) makes sense. The client who pays by the hour
reasonably sees herself as buying a professional service in the form of the
attorney's labor. The plaintiff in a class action is buying much more.
3. RECOGNIZING COST INVESTMENT AS A PROFESSIONAL SERVICE CLASS COUNSEL PROVIDE
The academic literature describes the role class counsel and other contingency
fee plaintiffs' lawyers play as including litigation funding and insurance against
the possibility of non-recovery. 113 But is that a "professional" service? Three
vantage points suggest an affirmative answer. As noted, ABA Formal Op. 93-379
looks at the client's expectations when distinguishing professional and other
services. From that vantage point, litigation funding is an essential professional
contracts."); see also HAZARD ETAL., supra note 83, at 8 14.1 ("[L]egal fees that are contingent on the outcome
of a matter are common in the United States, although they are prohibited in many other countries and were
formerly prohibited in this country.").
110. See Marc Galanter, Anyone Can Fall Down a Manhole: The Contingency Fee and Its Discontents, 47
DEPAUL L. REV. 457, 457 (1998) ("Denigration of the contingency fee has figured prominently in the
contemporary assault on the civil justice system that started in the late 1970s. Critics who behold a litigation
explosion, excessive litigiousness, runaway juries, too many lawyers and other evils, identify the contingency
fee as an important ingredient of the mess.").
111. See, e.g., Johnson v. Wright, 682 N.W.2d 671, 678 79 (Minn. Ct. App. 2004); Rancman v. Interim
Settlement Funding Corp., 789 N.E.2d 217, 221 (Ohio 2003) (voiding a third-party funding agreement as
champertous); see also Sebok, supra note 104, at 107 20 (canvassing the different ways states regulate
maintenance by third parties along the following dimensions: type of suit; investment mechanism; and whether
the investment caused the lawsuit).
112. See MODEL RULES R. 1.8 cmt. 16.
113. See Brickman, supra note 109, at 43-44 (characterizing the contingency fee as a means of financing
litigation and thereby creating access; characterizing contingency fee lawyers with diverse portfolios as
equivalent to insurers pooling litigation risks); Engstrom, supra note 14, at 411 (arguing that the contingency fee
"has always been understood to compensate plaintiffs' lawyers for a trio of services," including "actual
lawyering," banking services and "insurance services"); John Leubsdorf, The Contingency Factor in Attorney
Fee Awards, 90 YALE L.J. 473, 480 (1981) ("A lawyer who both bears the risk of not being paid and provides
legal services is not receiving fair market value of his work if he is paid only for the second of these functions.");
Jonathan T. Molot, A Market in Litigation Risk, 76 U. CHI L. REV. 367, 377 (2009) ("When a plaintiff's lawyer
accepts a case on a contingent fee basis, he absorbs from his client the risk that the recovery will not be enough
to cover litigation expenses.").
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service contingent fee counsel provide. 114 Injured persons retain contingent fee
counsel because they are unable or unwilling to finance litigation on their own.
While individual, non-class contingent fee agreements regularly require the
client to pay for litigation costs, 1 15 the typical class representative in a class
action is unable to fund case costs on behalf of the entire class. This is especially
true in small claims class actions, where it would be illogical for a named plaintiff
to agree to fund case costs when her expected recovery is only a small fraction of
those costs. Class action plaintiffs therefore reasonably expect class counsel to
advance both time and costs of litigation as a necessary part of the service they
provide, without which the class action could not proceed. 
116
From the perspective of the contingent fee lawyer, case filing and management
decisions-quintessential professional services-are case investment decisions.
A decision to represent a contingent fee plaintiff is a decision to invest in her
claim. Each case management choice made upon commencement of the action
has a price tag, in terms of both time and costs advanced by counsel. For example,
a motion to compel can easily cost several thousand dollars in attorney time. 
117
Similarly, the decision to retain a particular kind or quality of expert necessarily
entails disbursements for that expert's time. The lawyer making case manage-
ment decisions is simultaneously both a financier and an advocate, the former
professional role enabling and shaping the latter.
Finally, from the perspective of the court appointing class counsel, litigation
financing is a key professional service counsel must be able to competently
provide. Pursuant to Rule 23(g), the court appointing class counsel must consider
not only counsel's experience and knowledge, but, also, "the resources that
counsel will commit to representing the class"1 18 A trial court may be found to
have abused its discretion if it appoints class counsel who are incapable of
114. See Herbert M. Kritzer, The Wages of Risk: The Returns of Contingency Fee Legal Practice, 47 DEPAUL
L. REv. 267, 270 (1998) ("The normal hourly fee or flat fee simply purchases the services of a lawyer. Under a
contingency fee arrangement, the client also purchases additional services. The first is financing.").
115. Sample individual, non-class contingent fee agreements from both the American Bar Association and
various state bar associations have the lawyers advancing time but requiring clients to fund the cost of litigation.
See, e.g., P.A. Henrichsen, Sample Engagement Letters and Fee Agreements: Compensation Agreement
(Contingent Fee), ABA GPSOLO MAG. (Jan./Feb. 2007), available at http://www.americanbar.org/newsletter/
publications/gp-solo-magazine-home/gp-solo-magazine-index/sampleengageletters.html#letter-7; Sample Writ-
ten Fee Agreement Forms, STATE BAR OF CAL. 22 27 (2005), available at http://www.calbar.ca.gov/Portals/0/
documents/mfa/Sample-Fee-Agreement-Forms.pdf.
116. See Capra et al., supra note 21, at 844-49 (noting the trend toward recognition by courts of the practical
need for class counsel to bear the risk of advancing case costs, and thus to exempt class actions from DR
5-103(b), which made the client ultimately liable for case costs).
117. See, e.g., Limu Co., LLC v. Burling, No. 6:12-cv-347-Orl-TBS, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 108848, at *8
(M.D. Fla. Aug. 2, 2013) (awarding $2,170 in attorneys' fees as part of sanction on a motion to compel); I.R. v.
City of Fresno, No. 1:12 CV 00558 AWl GS, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 76969, at *23 (E.D. Ca. May 31, 2013)
(awarding $6,430.10 in attorney and paralegal time on a motions to compel and for sanctions).
118. FED. R Civ. P. 23(g)(iv).
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funding the litigation. 1 9 Rule 23's text thus requires courts to appreciate class
counsel's role as litigation funder.
To match the experiences and expectations of clients, counsel and courts in
class actions, the boundary line between "professional" and "other" services
should be moved to acknowledge class counsel's role as litigation funder. In the
alternative, one could simply discard the boundary line between "professional"
and "other" services as a meaningful heuristic to define permissible profits in the
class setting. The end result is the same: cost investment is presumptively capable
of producing direct profits.
B. THE LINE BETWEEN CONSENT AND ITS ABSENCE;
SIMULATED CONSENT
Absent disclosure at the outset of the attorney client relationship, typically as a
term in the fee agreement, attorneys in individual, non-class cases may not earn
direct cost profits. Instead, absent such ex ante disclosure, cost investment may
only be reimbursed. 120 The solution in individual cases is a relatively straightfor-
ward one: to reap direct cost profits, attorneys can disclose and ask clients to
agree to cost profits at the outset of the attorney-client relationship as a term in the
representation agreement.
In class actions, such ex ante contracting regarding the reward of cost
investment is impracticable. 121 Class members do not even find out about the
pendency of a class suit or the identity of class counsel until relatively late in the
litigation timeline, upon notice of class certification. While courts once routinely
certified litigation classes early in the proceedings, without requiring substantial
discovery, and often based only on the allegations in the complaint, the
certification decision now normally takes place in later stages of proceedings,
often after class counsel have made significant investments of both time and
119. See, e.g., Kimber v. Tallon, 556 Fed. App'x 27, 28 (2d Cir. 2014) (finding it was an abuse of discretion
for the district court to appoint as class counsel the Prisoner Rights Office of the Vermont Defender General
because that entity lacked sufficient resources).
120. ABA Formal Op. 93-379, supra note 19; San Diego Cnty. Bar Ass'n Legal Ethics Comm., Op. 2013-3
(2013).
121. See Samuel Issacharoff, The Governance Problem in Aggregate Litigation, 81 FORDHAM L. REv. 3165,
3167 (2013) ("There is no telling act by class members that would look like the realized buy-in of the capital
markets, or any other mechanism that would allow a clear signal of consent to representation. Instead, class
action law has to look for substitutes for the legally constructed rights of representation."). The PSLRA is one
attempt to restore the power of a client in class actions, one that has had mixed results. See James D. Cox &
Randall S. Thomas with Dana Kiku, Does the Plaintiff Matter? An Empirical Analysis of Lead Plaintiffs in
Securities Class Actions, 106 COLUM. L. REv. 1587, 1515, 1623, 1628 29 (2006) (finding that a stable cluster of
firms continue to dominate class counsel appointments; that individuals rather than institutions continue to
comprise a plurality of the named plaintiffs; and that case outcomes in securities cases post-dating the PSLRA
have not improved). Moreover, this kind of reform does not address the more fundamental issue, for our
purposes, of a lack of opportunity for ex ante contracting between class counsel and absent class members.
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costs. 122 In many cases, no litigation class is certified, and the class members
instead discover the pendency of the class case only after it has settled, when
nearly all of the work for which class counsel can bill time or costs has been done.
The problem is that the laws structuring all of the basic features of the
lawyer-client relationship-from its formation to its termination-are grounded
in an individual, non-class setting on contract principles pursuant to which
disclosure or client consent create the conditions of the agency relationship, on
the assumption that there is a client who is present to receive disclosures and give
consent. That contract approach simply does not work in class actions because
absent class members have no opportunity to negotiate with class counsel. For
example, contrary to law governing lawyers in non-class litigation, the formation
of the attorney client relationship in class actions is not one that involves absent
class member consent, 12 3 except through the artifice of the implied consent that
arises when a class member declines to opt out in Rule 23(b)(3) (voluntary)
classes; 12 4 even that artifice is unavailable in mandatory classes. Nor can class
members fire class counsel, 12 5 though they may seek to appear through counsel or
to attempt to intervene under Rule 24; 126 instead, class counsel are appointed and
serve at the pleasure of the court. Class members do not determine the scope of
the representation; 127 decisions regarding how to frame the dispute and regarding
which claims and remedies to pursue are made by class counsel and the
representative plaintiffs in the first instance when they file the motion for class
certification, and by the court when deciding it. Nor do class members control or
122. See Mullenix, supra note 28, at 612 15.
123. The Model Rules do not establish the point of formation of the attorney client relationship, and instead
refer to other law. See MODEL RULES scope, 17. That law typically determines the commencement point of the
relationship from the perspective of the reasonable client. See, e.g., Togstad v. Vesely, 291 N.W.2d 686 (Minn.
1980) (applying tort and contract principles to identify commencement point of a relationship between lawyer
and potential client sufficient to give rise to malpractice liability).
124. See Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 812 13 (1985) ("We reject petitioner's contention
that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires that absent plaintiffs affirmatively 'opt in' to
the class, rather than be deemed members of the class if they do not 'opt out."'); STEPHEN C. YEAZELL, FROM
MEDIEVAL GROUP LITIGATION TO THE MODERN CLASS ACTION 256 (1987) (Rule 23 "presumes acquiescence by
requiring the class member to step forward to withdraw, instead of requiring members to volunteer").
125. Model Rule 1.16 gives clients the right to terminate the lawyer-client relationship. Class representa-
tives, on the other hand, may not. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(g)(4) advisory committee's notes ("The class
representatives do not have an unfettered right to 'fire' class counsel.").
126. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(D)(1)(B)(iii) acknowledges their right to intervene and present claims or defenses, or
to otherwise come into the action, and thus acknowledges a route, cabined by the dictates of FED. R. CIV. P. 24,
by which class members may convert from absent to named parties. See generally WILLIAM B. RUBENSTEIN,
NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS §§ 9:30-36, at 481 521 (5th ed. 2013).
127. Model Rule 1.2, regarding the scope of representation and the allocation of authority between lawyer
and client, states that "a lawyer shall abide by a client's decisions concerning the objectives of representation,"
giving authority to a client regarding the very purpose of the representation that an absent class member cannot
exercise except through the class representative.
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even consent to the fact, timing, or terms of settlement; 128 instead, they learn of
settlement only after it is reached and granted preliminary approval by the court,
whereupon they may but need not actually receive notice of it. 129 Nor does or can
a class member consent in advance to fee arrangements, despite the clear
language of Rule 1.5;130 instead, the court sets attorney's fees.
While consent to cost profits cannot be elicited in a class action in the same
way it can be in an individual representation, consent can nevertheless be
simulated. In fact, simulated consent is the procedural path that legitimizes the
appointment of class counsel, class settlement, and class counsel's fee award,
despite the absence of express client consent. Traditionally, a facsimile of consent
is manufactured by three interrelated mechanisms: trial court intervention in the
proceedings in a fiduciary capacity, 131 e.g., to appoint and pay counsel 13 2 and to
evaluate proposed settlements; 133 the requirement of adequate representation by
counsel and the class representatives; and the creation of opportunities for class
members to participate (via notice, and the right to intervene or comment) or, in
voluntary classes, to exit by opting out. 134 In this way, there is a shift from a
128. Model Rule 1.2 gives the client authority to determine whether to settle a case, stating that a "lawyer
shall abide by a client's decision whether to settle a matter." See also Geoffrey P. Miller, Conflicts of Interest in
Class Action Litigation: An Inquiry into the Appropriate Standard, 2003 U. CHi. LEGAL F. 581, 587 (2003)
("[T]he ordinary ethics rules protecting against conflicts of interest cannot apply in class actions without
substantial modification. Consent is the lynchpin of these rules, and consent is impossible in class actions, either
to waive conflicts or to authorize aggregate settlements.").
129. Juris v. Inamed Corp., 685 F.3d 1294, 1321 (1 th Cir. 2012) ("Courts have consistently recognized that,
even in Rule 23(b)(3) class actions, due process does not require that class members actually receive notice.").
130. See MODEL RULES R. 1.5(b) ("The scope of the representation and the basis or rate of the fee and
expenses for which the client will be responsible shall be communicated to the client, preferably in writing,
before or within a reasonable time after commencing the representation .... "); MODEL RULES R. 1.5(c) ("A
contingent fee agreement shall be in writing signed by the client and shall state the method by which the fee is to
be determined, including the percentage or percentages that shall accrue to the lawyer in the event of settlement,
trial or appeal; litigation and other expenses to be deducted from the recovery; and whether such expenses are to
be deducted before or after the contingent fee is calculated.").
131. See, e.g., FED. R. Civ. P. 23(d) (giving the court authority to issue orders for the benefit of the class,
including orders requiring notice "to protect class members and fairly conduct the action"); In re Cendant Corp.
Litig., 404 F.3d 173, 187 (3d Cir. 2005) ("The court's scrutiny is, in essence, a substitute for active client
involvement, which is so often difficult to obtain in class actions. In traditional common fund cases, the court
acts almost as a fiduciary for the class, performing some of the roles i.e., monitoring and compensating class
counsel that clients in individual suits normally take on themselves."); Reynolds v. Beneficial Nat'l Bank, 288
E3d 277, 279 80 (7th Cir. 2001) ("We and other courts have gone so far as to term the district judge in the
settlement phase of a class action suit a fiduciary of the class, who is subject therefore to the high duty of care
that the law requires of fiduciaries.").
132. See FED. R. Civ. P. 23(g) (h). More recently, via the addition by amendment of Rule 23(g)(3), we can
add another mechanism, the appointment of interim class counsel in the early phases of litigation, which more
closely approximates the timing of consent required in individual litigation. However, Rule 23(g)(3) is
permissive; courts are not required to appoint interim class counsel in the early phases of class litigation.
133. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(e).
134. See Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 811 12 (1985) ("If the forum State wishes to bind an
absent plaintiff concerning a claim for money damages or similar relief at law, it must provide minimal
procedural due process protection. The plaintiff must receive notice plus an opportunity to be heard and
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contractual 13 5 approach to structuring the lawyer-client relationship to a fiduciary
and participatory one, where-at least in theory 136 -the court secures the class
members' interests and the class members are given opportunities to participate.
These conceptual and doctrinal shifts create a space in class actions between
consent and its absence, one that recognizes the court's role in creating and
structuring the lawyer-client relationship in such actions. In class actions, court
supervision throughout the proceeding and the opportunity for absent class
member participation at key procedural moments (e.g., to opt out of a certified
class or object to a proposed settlement) substitute for and simulate ex ante
consent. In that space, we can ground simulated consent to cost profits, just as we
do for consent to participate in the proceeding as a class member, settle a claim,
or pay counsel a fee.
C. THE LINE BETWEEN ACCEPTABLE AND UNACCEPTABLE CONFLICTS
Agent Orange can be read broadly to suggest that direct cost profits are always
impermissible because they create conflicts between class counsel and the
class, 137 or narrowly, to hold only that the agreement among counsel to reallocate
fees in that case created such conflicts. The broad reading-that cost profits are
participate in the litigation, whether in person or through counsel .... Additionally, we hold that due process
requires at a minimum that an absent plaintiff be provided with an opportunity to remove himself from the
class by executing and returning an 'opt out' or 'request for exclusion' form to the court. Finally, the Due
Process Clause of course requires that the named plaintiff at all times adequately represent the interests of absent
class members."). But see Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Ethics and the Settlements of Mass Torts: When the Rules
Meet the Road, 80 CORNELL L. REV. 1159, 1193 94 (1995) (questioning whether these kinds of procedural
mechanisms are authorized by the ethics rules).
135. See, e.g., C.K. Indus. Corp. v. C.M. Indus. Corp., 623 N.Y.S.2d 410, 411 (N.Y. App. Div. 1995) (An
attorney-client relationship "arises when a contract is formed between attorney and client for the performance of
legal services or the rendition of legal advice"); Burns v. Valene, 214 N.W.2d 686, 688 89 (Minn. 1974)
(applying general contract principles to the fee agreement between attorney and client, despite the fiduciary
nature of the relationship).
136. The efficacy of these devices to substitute for or simulate consent is open to question. For example, the
right to opt out of a class action can be experienced by class members as an illusory one, especially in "negative
value" suits that are not as economically viable as non-class claims. See Jay Tidmarsh, Rethinking Adequacy of
Representation, 87 TEX. L. REV. 1137, 1167 68 (2009) ("The paradigmatic case is 'large-scale, small-stakes'
litigation, also known as 'negative-value' suits. Assume that a credit-card company has illegally overcharged ten
million customers $2 apiece. It is unlikely that very many, if any, individual cases will be filed; the costs of
litigating each case exceeds the expected recovery (thus giving the suit a negative net value)."). Similarly, the
meaningfulness of the right to object has been questioned. See, e.g., Theodore Eisenberg & Geoffrey Miller, The
Role of pt-Outs and Objectors in Class Action Litigation: Theoretical and Empirical Issues, 57 VAND. L. REV.
1529, 1560 (2004) (questioning whether class members value the opportunity to object); Christopher R. Leslie,
The Significance of Silence: Collective Action Problems and Class Action Settlements, 59 FLA. L. REV. 71, 90
(2007) ("Courts have been far too quick to treat class member silence as universal support for a proposed
settlement ... [C]ourts have systematically misinterpreted the silence of the class by ignoring more plausible
explanations for class members' failure to object to a proposed settlement.").
137. See Capra et al, supra note 21, at 852 ("Read strictly, the Second Circuit's decision would permit some
fee sharing agreements, but would prohibit one that promised a 'return on investment,' such as the Agent
Orange arrangement.").
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categorically improper on conflicts grounds-goes to the method by which a trial
court may calculate fees and costs, and is analogous to the choice between use of
the lodestar or percentage of fund methods for calculating fees. The narrow
reading-that this particular agreement among counsel was improper-goes to
the distinct issue of whether counsel's contractual commitments regarding the
allocation of fees rendered them impermissibly conflicted. The broad and narrow
readings implicate different concerns and doctrinal frameworks. The court could
have held that as a general rule trial courts may or should award direct cost profits
in appropriate circumstances as part of a fee and cost award method, but could
nevertheless have found that the contract among counsel to create such profits in
this case was improper. That is, the process of drawing a boundary line between
permissible and impermissible conflicts varies depending on whether a court is
choosing a fee and cost award methodology or is instead examining the conduct
of counsel in a specific case. In either circumstance, the conflicts analysis should
be tailored to the class action's distinctive procedural contours, which the Second
Circuit in Agent Orange failed to do.
1. CHOOSING A FEE AND COST AWARD METHODOLOGY
Should a method for awarding of fees or costs to class counsel be rejected
because it creates conflicts between class counsel and the class? The answer is
surely "no." Lawyers and clients are inherently conflicted regarding fees and
costs: lawyers want to maximize their profits while clients want to maximize their
own net gains. With regard to fees, the choice is never between a method for
calculating fees that generates conflict and one that does not. Building on the
same economic theory discussed above, 138 courts recognize that all existing
139
fee calculation methods create conflicts of interest. 140 The lodestar approach
rewards counsel for being inefficient and for taking too long to resolve a
138. See Coffee, supra note 11.
139. Commentators have made adventuresome and creative proposals to minimize agency costs in class
actions. See, e.g., Jay Tidmarsh, Auctioning Class Settlements, 56 WM. & MARY L. REv. 227 (2014) (canvassing
various proposals, and adding a new one, to wit: courts should put proposed class settlements up for auction, in
connection with which third parties can purchase the class claims, with purchase proceeds going to the class);
Jay Tidmarsh, Cy Pres and the Optimal Class Action, 82 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 767, 787 (2014) (citing Kevin M.
Clermont & John D. Currivan, Improving on the Contingent Fee, 63 CORNELL L. REV. 529, 546-47 (1978));
Macey & Miller, supra note 11, at 105 16 (proposing auctioning class claims to the highest bidder) (reviving
and applying to class actions a little-noticed proposal to combine an hourly and percentage approach to better
align the interests of lawyer and client).
140. Professor Nancy Moore has argued that this conflict is not normally addressed via conflicts of interest
doctrine because it is not unique to any particular lawyer, and is instead an agency problem endemic to legal
practice. See Nancy J. Moore, What Doctors Can Learn from Lawyers About Conflicts of Interest, 81 B.U. L.
REv. 445, 451 (2001) (stating that conflict of interest rules do "not purport to regulate circumstances that are
common to all lawyers, but only circumstances that are unique to specific lawyers.").
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matter. 141 Conversely, the percentage of fund approach creates the incentive for
class counsel to settle prematurely. 142 No court has yet adopted a fee method in
class actions that avoids conflicts altogether.
As a result, the boundary line between tolerable and intolerable conflicts of
interest with regard to the method of awarding class counsel's fees is not at the
point that conflicts arise. Instead, it is a relative point; though other policy
concerns come into play, 143 when deciding which fee award methods to enable or
require, jurisdictions tend to promote the fee award method that best allows them
to manage rather than eliminate agency costs. That is why the familiar refrain
adopted by courts permitting or requiring the percentage method in common fund
cases is that it better aligns the interests of class counsel and class members by
rewarding counsel for success and penalizing them for failure. 144 Courts so
holding do not claim that the percentage method eliminates conflicts between
class counsel and the class. Instead, they are making a comparison of relative
conflicts, asserting that the percentage method generally leaves counsel relatively
less conflicted than does the lodestar method. 
145
Similarly, with regard to a method for rewarding cost investment, the question
is how a regime in which cost profits are prohibited compares to one in which
they are allowed in terms of the conflicts they create between class counsel and
141. See McDaniel v. Cnty. of Schenectady, 595 E3d 411, 418 (2d Cir. 2010) (the lodestar method inspires
class counsel "to bill as many hours as possible to do unnecessary work, and for these reasons also can create a
disincentive to early settlement"); In re Activision Sec. Litig., 723 F. Supp. 1373, 1378 (N.D. Cal. 1989)
(concluding that the lodestar method can encourage unjustified work and delay).
142. See In re Synthroid Mktg. Litig., 264 F.3d 712, 721 (7th Cir. 2001) ("This is not to say that systems with
declining marginal percentages are always best. They also create declining marginal returns to legal work,
ensuring that at some point attorneys' opportunity costs will exceed the benefits of pushing for a larger recovery,
even though extra work could benefit the client. This feature exacerbates the agency costs inherent in any
percentage-of-recovery system, just as the lodestar approach creates the opposite incentive to run up the billable
hours."); In re GMC Pick-Up Truck Fuel Tank Prod. Liab. Litig., 55 F.3d 768, 801 (3d Cir. 1995) ("Economic
models have shown how conventional methods of calculating class action fee awards give class counsel
incentives to act earlier than their clients would deem optimal." (citing Coffee, supra note 11, at 688)); see also
Macey & Miller, supra note 11, at 25 ("Attorneys compensated on a percentage method have an incentive to
settle early for an amount lower than what might be obtained by further effort.").
143. For example, the lodestar method is preferred in fee-shifting cases to inspire the correct level of private
enforcement of the law, rather than to tether the interests of class counsel and the class with regard to case
outcomes. See, e.g., Drazin v. Horizon Blue Cross Blue Shield of N.J., Inc., 832 F Supp. 2d 432, 440 (D. N.J.
2012) ("Because the lodestar award is de-coupled from the class recovery, the lodestar assures counsel
undertaking socially beneficial litigation (as legislatively identified by the statutory fee shifting provision) an
adequate fee irrespective of the monetary value of the final relief achieved for the class .... ") (quoting In re
GMC, 55 E3d at 821)).
144. See, e.g., Union Asset Mgmt. Holding A.G. v. Dell, Inc., 669 E3d 632 (5th Cir. 2012) ("The percentage
method also brings certain advantages. The district court in this case selected it over the lodestar method in part
because it allows for easy computation, it aligns the interests of class counsel with those of the class members,
and it was the method Union chose in the retainer agreement.").
145. See, e.g., Swedish Hosp. Corp. v. Shalala, 1 E3d 1261, 1269 (D.C. Cir. 1993) ("That is, in the common
fund case, if a percentage-of-the-fund calculation controls, inefficiently expended hours only serve to reduce the
per hour compensation of the attorney expending them.").
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the class. As the Second Circuit pointed out in Agent Orange, direct cost profits
create conflicts between class counsel and the class: 146 investor attorneys may
have the incentive to settle prematurely, e.g., accepting an offer of settlement that
allows them to obtain their return on cost investment regardless of whether
investing additional time would be to the advantage of class members. 
147
But to decide whether a fee and cost award method should enable direct cost
profits, one needs a comparator, i.e., the agency costs flowing from a regime in
which direct cost profits are prohibited. That kind of comparison suggests that
enabling cost profits entails lower agency costs than prohibiting them. Prohibit-
ing direct cost profits creates potential agency costs in all cases in which the
lodestar method will or may be used to calculate the fee and cost award. 148 These
costs include the loss in welfare consistently experienced by class members as a
result of class counsel's disincentive to make the level of cost investment that
best serves class members' interests. 149
Whereas, if cost profits are enabled, conflicts of the kind noted by the Second
Circuit are likely to arise only in limited settings. If the same firm is making
both time and cost investment, and if time and cost investment are equally
rewarded, then there is no incentive to underinvest in litigation based on the
fact that cost investment is directly profitable.1 5 0 The benefit to counsel of
premature settlement as a result of the availability of direct cost profits arises only
if the reward on time and cost investment is experienced as unequal, either
because multiple firms investing in a class action have varying mixes of cost and
time investment or because time and cost investment are both potentially
profitable but to different degrees.
Both conditions existed in Agent Orange. Via contract, counsel agreed to
reallocate any fee so that cost-investment was rewarded first at a 3.0 multiplier,
with time investment being rewarded only after cost-investors were paid. 1 51 As a
result of this agreement among counsel, the usual bias in favor of time investment
was inverted. Cost investment was profitable, but time investment was rewarded
far less generously. By way of example, David Dean, lead counsel for the
plaintiff class, was a "noninvestor" attorney whose time investment dwarfed his
cost investment. The court awarded him a fee of $1,424,283 under the lodestar
method, but, as a result of the fee allocation agreement among counsel, he was
paid only $542,310.152 On the other hand, as a result of the reallocation
146. In re Agent Orange Prod. Liab. Litig., 818 E2d 216, 224 (2d Cir. 1987).
147. Id.
148. See Ratner & Rubenstein, supra note 6, at 600-07.
149. See id.
150. See id. at 609 11.
151. See Agent Orange, 818 E2d at 219 n. 1 ("The agreement, in pertinent part, provided as follows: 'When
and if funds are received ... the first priority distribution will be to distribute to [cost investing counsel] an
amount equivalent to the actual monies expended... with a multiplier of three.").
152. Id. at 220.
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agreement, cost-investing counsel received far more than the court awarded to
them using the lodestar method; in one extreme example, Newton Schwartz, a
cost-investing attorney, was awarded only $41,886 in fees by the trial court under
the lodestar method, but received $513,026 as a result of the allocation agreement
that awarded direct cost profits. 
153
It is this peculiar favoring of cost investment, both in terms of the guaranteed
multiplier and in terms of its priority of payment out of any court-awarded fee,
that created the conflict in Agent Orange between class counsel and the class
regarding settlement, because, the Second Circuit held, cost-investing counsel
had no incentive to litigate once they received their return on investment. 154 This
effect was exacerbated because a majority of lead counsel were predominantly
cost-investors; so those lawyers were in a position to determine the timing of a
premature settlement. That perfect storm of skewed incentives is unlikely to arise
in the normal course, where courts set the fee and cost awards at the back end of a
successful class action, without favoring cost investment. Instead, on balance,
enabling direct cost profits as part of the fee and cost award methodology is likely
to better align the interests of class counsel and class members than does a regime
in which such profits are flatly prohibited. 
155
2. WHEN AN AGREEMENT To REALLOCATE FEES AMONG CLASS COUNSEL GENERATES
IMPERMISSIBLE CONFLICTS
Agent Orange also asked whether the particular agreement among counsel to
reallocate fees to create cost profits was unenforceable because it created
impermissible conflicts between class counsel and the class. 156 Resolving that
question involves a different kind of boundary line drawing than courts use when
fashioning or selecting a fee and cost award method. 157 Instead of comparing
alternative cost-investment reward methods potentially available in class actions
generally, a court distinguishes tolerable and intolerable conflicts of interest
153. Id.
154. The court's comments regarding the incentive for premature settlement are at odds with the actual
timing of settlement in that case, just a few hours before jury selection was scheduled to commence. See id. at
166 (the settlement was reached "just before dawn on the day of trial after sleepless hours of bargaining").
155. See Ratner & Rubenstein, supra note 6, at 600-07.
156. Agent Orange, 818 F.2d at 223 24. The court also expressed concern that cost profits in that case,
accomplished via a transfer of fees among firms, might constitute impermissible fee sharing among lawyers in
different firms. Id. at 220, 226. That ethical concern arose only as a result of the fact that counsel attempted to
accomplish cost profits via private ordering, and would not arise in the normal course, where cost profits are
awarded by the trial court. Id. at 226 ("Finally, we do not find class counsel to have formed an ad hoc
partnership. They merely are a group of individual lawyers and law firms associated in the prosecution of a
single lawsuit, and they lack the ongoing relationship that is the essential element of attorneys practicing as
partners.").
157. One need not go down this analytical path in order to evaluate the ethics of cost profits as part of a fee
and cost award methodology. But because Agent Orange is the leading case, and, in it, the Second Circuit
conflated the two issues, I separately evaluate conflicts flowing from counsel's fee allocation contracts.
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flowing from counsel's peculiar commitments in a particular case by undertaking
a risk assessment to determine if the contractually-created conflict is sufficiently
problematic to warrant categorizing it as impermissible. While conflicts inherent
in the payment of fees may be common to all for-profit lawyers in class and
non-class settings, conflicts associated with agreements among lawyers to share
or reallocate fees are not; thus, depending on the outcome of a risk-assessment,
there may be relatively little or no tolerance for resulting conflicts.
In Agent Orange, the question arose in the procedural context of a motion to
set aside a fee sharing agreement among counsel, and thus focused on whether
the conflicts the agreement created rendered it unenforceable. But the court could
have framed the conflicts question differently, as a question of class counsel's
adequacy.1 58  If class counsel are impermissibly conflicted, then they are, by
definition, inadequate. 159 The requirement of adequate representation is codified
in Rule 23,160 but finds deeper roots in the Due Process Clause, which has been
read to demand adequate representation as the most basic quid pro quo justifying
the class action as an exception to the general rule against non-party preclu-
sion. 16 1 One suspects that the Second Circuit was unwilling to enforce the
agreement among counsel in Agent Orange, but had no desire to go further and to
upset the entire apple cart of the class action settlement-though it could have.
a. Identifying Conflicts
Though a test is not yet fully articulated, doctrinally, three factors should be
particularly relevant to any assessment of whether a fee allocation contract
among counsel designed to create cost profits generates conflicts of interest: 
162
158. See, e.g., Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 626 n.20 (1997) (the adequacy of
representation requirement is concerned with the "competency and conflicts of class counsel."); Wininger v. SI
Mgmt. L.P., 301 E3d 1115, 1122 (9th Cir. 2002) ("[T]he question of whether there is an ethical conflict forms
part of the class certification question."); Sandoval v. Ali, No. C -13-03230(EDL), 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
42630, at *28 35 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 28, 2014) (defendants' motion to disqualify class counsel analyzed as
implicating the "adequacy of representation" requirement).
159. See Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815, 856 (1999) (requiring sub-classes with sufficiently
competing interests to have separate counsel); Radcliffe v. Experian Info. Solutions, Inc., No. 11-56376, 2013
U.S. App. LEXIS 7932, *24 (9th Cir. 2013) ("As soon as the conditional-incentive-awards provision divorced
the interests of the class representatives from those of the absent class members, class counsel was
simultaneously representing clients with conflicting interests .... Class counsel thus was not adequate ..... ).
See also Linda S. Mullenix, Taking Adequacy Seriously: The Inadequate Assessment ofAdequacy in Litigation
and Settlement Classes, 57 VAND. L. REV. 1687, 1715 (2004) (noting that the message of Ortiz was, in part, that
"class counsel may be found to be inadequate if counsel is not competent and has conflicts of interest").
160. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(4) and 23(g).
161. See Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 812 (1985) ("[T]he Due Process Clause of course
requires that the named plaintiff at all times adequately represent the interests of the absent class members.");
Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 42-43 (1940) ("[M]embers of a class not present as parties to the litigation may
be bound by the judgment where they are in fact adequately represented by parties who are present .... ").
162. These factors are consistent with current case law, even if they are not part of a clearly-defined doctrinal
test for conflicts in this setting.
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the timing of the agreement; the extent to which cost profits are fixed; and the
degree to and purposes for which time and cost investment are disproportionately
rewarded. In terms of timing, courts are more likely to be concerned about
conflicts associated with agreements reached in early phases of litigation, as was
the case in Agent Orange, via contracts among co-counsel to reallocate fee and
cost awards. It is typical for settlement class counsel to allocate a fee and cost
award made by the court post-judgment, after the work necessary to resolve a
class case has been done, with lead or a committee of counsel using knowledge of
the benefits conferred by all counsel to guide the division of any award. 163 Any
agreements reached at that point in the litigation typically do not raise conflicts
concerns, because counsel's case management decisions have already been made,
and because all such allocations are typically subject to court review in the event
counsel disagree. Instead, conflicts concerns arise when the lawyers serving as
class counsel reach agreements before a case is resolved because the terms of
such agreements have the chance to influence counsel's decisions regarding
litigation or settlement of the class action and thus may cause counsel's and the
class members' interests to diverge. Not all ex ante agreements create conflicts.
Courts must consider additional factors.
Agreements that establish disproportionate profits on time and cost investment
without regard to the benefit conferred on the class are more likely to create
conflicts of interest than are agreements to either normalize 164 the profits on time
and cost investment or to permit disparities only to the extent doing so rewards
class counsel for being efficient. In Agent Orange, the agreement among counsel
to ensure a 3.0 multiplier on costs, paid before any time investment was
rewarded, may have reflected the relative difficulty of securing cost investment in
that case and thus may have captured the relative benefit to class members of that
category of case investment, at least as of the point it was made. But the
reallocation agreement in that case was the mirror image of the distortions in
investment incentives chronicled in Section II, biasing cost rather than time
investment, and thus created new wedges between counsel and the class. 165 The
court noted one of these distortions, i.e., the incentive to settle prematurely as
soon as a settlement amount was offered that could guarantee the 3.0 multiplier
on costs. The court could also have found that the agreement created conflicts by
making cost investment more attractive than time investment, even if time
investment was better for the class.
163. See Milliron v. T-Mobile, USA, Inc., 423 F. App'x 131, 134 (3d Cir. 2011) ("Generally, a district court
may rely on lead counsel to distribute attorneys' fees among those involved.").
164. To "normalize" rewards on time and cost investment is to eliminate the disparity in reward, i.e., to make
time and cost investment equally profitable.
165. A fourth feature of the agreement in Agent Orange was cause for alarm it was reached in secret. In re
Agent Orange Prod. Liab. Litig. 818 F.2d 145, 218 (2d Cir. 1987). The Advisory Committee note to Rule 23(h),
added in 2003, suggests that such agreements should be disclosed in the normal course.
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b. Assessing Whether the Conflicts Are Impermissible
Even if the Second Circuit reasonably concluded that the agreement to
reallocate fees in Agent Orange created conflicts, the court's conclusion that
those conflicts were impermissible rested, as this Section demonstrates, on a
truncated analysis by modern standards, one that failed to fully account for the
differences between class and non-class actions. Although the case law is
muddled on this point, there is a reading of it that demonstrates how conflicts can
and should be evaluated so as to recognize the distinctive roles of courts and
plaintiffs' counsel in class actions.
Two lines of cases expose a tension within modern conflicts-of-interest
analysis in class actions. First, the Supreme Court's decisions in Amchem Prods.
Inc. v. Windsor1 6 6 and Ortiz v. Fibreboard16 7 amplify the conflicts-of-interests
concerns embedded in the adequacy of representation requirement. Second, a line
of high profile intermediate appellate court cases including Lazy Oil Co. v. Wito
Corp. 168 has consistently reiterated over the years that professional conflicts rules
applicable to individual cases cannot be mechanically applied in class actions
because doing so would undermine the class device. 169 At first blush, the two
lines of cases appear to pull in different directions. The suggestion in Amchem
and Ortiz that subclasses with distinct interests need separate, unconflicted
counsel tugs against the idea that conflicts-of-interest concerns must be relaxed
or at least applied pragmatically in class cases to account for the unique nature of
the class action and to avoid depriving class members of knowledgeable counsel.
Post-Amchem and Ortiz decisions by intermediate federal courts-though
cacophonous-show how the two lines of cases can be read to converge on a
single cluster of factors to distinguish tolerable and intolerable conflicts in class
166. Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 626 (1997). In this case, the conflict arose from the
presence in the same class, with the same representation, of persons with diametrically opposed interests with
regard to settlement fund allocation. Persons with present asbestos-related injuries were interested in generous
and immediate payments, whereas persons with exposure-only claims were interested in assuring the existence
of an adequate fund to pay future claims. The Court held that separate classes were required under the
circumstances, with separate representation. Id.
167. Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815, 854 59 (1999).
168. Lazy Oil Co. v. Witco Corp., 166 F.3d 581, 589 (3d Cir. 1999) ("[T]he conflict rules do not appear to be
drafted with class action procedures in mind and may be at odds with the policies underlying the class action
rules.").
169. See, e.g., Eubank v. Pella Corp., 753 F.3d 718, 722 (7th Cir. 2014) ("A lawyer's switching sides in the
same lawsuit would normally be considered a fatal conflict of interest, but the courts are lenient when it is a class
action lawyer."); In re Agent Orange Prod. Liab. Litig., 800 E2d 14, 18 19 (2d Cir. 1986) ("When an action has
continued over the course of many years, the prospect of having those most familiar with its course and status be
automatically disqualified whenever class members have conflicting interests would substantially diminish the
efficacy of the class action as a method of dispute resolution."); Parker v. Anderson, 667 E2d 1204, 1211 (5th
Cir. 1982) ("Courts have recognized that the duty owed by class counsel is to the entire class and is not
dependent on the special desires of the named plaintiffs.").
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actions, 170 in a way that tends to limit the extent to which Amhem and Ortiz
render class counsel impermissibly conflicted: 171 First, courts look at the degree
of conflict, i.e., the extent to which interests are completely oppositional or
merely misaligned. 172 Second, courts consider the probability that a possible
conflict will manifest; if the probability is too low, the conflict is deemed
theoretical and thus not disabling. 173 Relatedly, and third, courts look to the
ability of courts in class actions to provide other structural assurances of fairness
besides entirely eliminating the conflict. 174 Fourth, courts assess the likely cost of
any conflict if it arises, in terms of the loss in welfare experienced by the class
members due to class counsel's disloyalty; logically, that cost should be a net
figure, i.e., net of the cost in terms of class member welfare of eliminating the
disloyalty. 175 For example, some circumstances have the potential to both align
170. A number of prominent commentators have argued against an unduly strict reading of Amchem and
Ortiz as adopting a zero tolerance rule for conflicts. See, e.g., Samuel Issacharoff & Richard A. Nagareda, Class
Settlements Under Attack, 156 U. PA. L. REv. 1649, 1683 (2008) ("No class action can account for all
conceivable differences among its members."); Charles Silver & Lynn Baker, I Cut, You Choose: The Role of
Plaintiffs' Counsel in Allocating Settlement Proceeds, 84 VA. L. REV. 1465, 1468 (1998) ("[W]e think that
Amchem, if it in fact establishes a strict 'no conflicts' rule for class actions, is unworkable and wrong. Conflicts
of interest and associated tradeoffs among plaintiffs are an unavoidable part of all group lawsuits and all group
settlements."). A sentence fragment in Ortiz suggests that this commentary likely aligns with the Court's
intentions. See Ortiz, 527 U.S. at 857 ("[Alt some point there has to be an end to reclassification with separate
counsel ..... ).
171. See, e.g., Wallace v. Powell, No. 3:09-cv-286, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 69001, *54-55 (M.D. Pa. May
14, 2013) (citing Lazy Oil Co. in support of a reading of Ortiz that does not render class counsel who represent
individual clients as well as the class impermissibly conflicted in all circumstances).
172. See, e.g., Prof'l Firefighters Ass'n of Omaha, Local 385 v. Zalewski, 678 F.3d 640, 647 (8th Cir. 2012)
(finding class counsel to be adequate, despite representing both active and retired employees in the same class,
because the conflicts between them, though present, were less "stark" than the conflicts between present and
future injury plaintiffs inAmchem); Allen v. Holiday Universal, 249 F.R.D. 166, 182 (E.D. Pa. 2008) ("Conflicts
between class members based on their respective relationships to the defendant are relevant only when the class
representatives' economic interests and objectives substantially conflict with those of absent class members.").
But see Wolfert v. Transamerica Home First, Inc., 439 F.3d 165, 173 (2d Cir. 2006) (suggesting that even though
"[t]here is no litmus test for determining when interests of one or more absent class members are sufficiently
distinct from those of the class representatives to render those representatives inadequate," that mere variations
in the law applicable to class claims could, if sufficiently different, require separate representation).
173. See, e.g., Prof'l Firefighters, 678 F.3d at 646 (stating that merely theoretical conflicts do not require
subclassing or disqualification of counsel, (citing Reynolds v. Nat'l Football League, 584 F.2d 280, 286 (8th Cir.
1978))); In re Chicken Antitrust Litig. Am. Poultry, 669 F.2d 228, 237 (5th Cir. 1982) (same).
174. See, e.g., Prof'l Firefighters, 678 F.3d at 647 (recognizing a conflict among active and retired employee
class members, but finding that separate classes with separate counsel were unnecessary where the court
provided other structural assurances of fairness, including permitting five retired firefighters to intervene with
separate counsel and participate in settlement negotiations).
175. Professor Tidmarsh has helpfully characterized Amchem as involving a "nonconsequentialist" approach
to conflicts that does not weigh "the benefits of settlement against the costs of less than ideal representation."
Tidmarsh, supra note 136, at 1157. That is true. The majority in Amchem was clearly underwhelmed by the
utilitarian approach Justice Breyer outlined in his dissent, which would have balanced the costs of alleged
conflicts against the costs of deeming counsel to be conflicted, i.e., the loss of an opportunity to resolve the
asbestos litigation morass. Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 622 23, 625 28 (1997). As the Court
explained again in Ortiz, the fact of settlement cannot override the requirements of Rule 23, one of which is
adequacy of representation. Put differently, Rule 23(e) cannot swallow Rule 23(a) or (b), regarding certification,
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and misalign the incentives of class counsel and class members-e.g., the
allocation of a fee among counsel. Courts consider all of the foregoing factors in
light of the unique nature and purposes of the class action as a procedural
device. 176
Under this reading, Amchem and Ortiz did not express a zero tolerance policy
regarding conflicts. Instead, their seeming strictness results from the fact that the
conflicts were unusually severe, highly probable, difficult to manage, and
needlessly manufactured. They were severe in that the competing interests
counsel concurrently pursued were diametrically opposed; 177 that places them in
the same category as the conflicts in Hansberry v. Lee. 178 It was highly probable
that the conflicts would manifest, because they were central to the issues in the
case. They were needlessly manufactured by the settling parties as part of a
settlement agreement, rather than as an integral part of the operation of Rule 23,
because the settling parties chose the breadth of the settlement classes, the
separate treatment of class and non-class clients, and, in Ortiz, the limited fund
framework, so they could not persuasively argue that tolerance of the conflicts
was somehow necessary to the operation of the class action as a procedural
device. 179
or 23(g), regarding appointment of class counsel. But, even so, courts may and do still consider the loss in
welfare associated with eliminating conflicts, other than the loss of a particular settlement. See Lazy Oil Co. v.
Witco Corp., 166 E3d 581, 590 (3d Cir. 1999) ("We therefore hold that, in the class action context, once some
class representatives object to a settlement negotiated on their behalf, class counsel may continue to represent
the remaining class representatives and the class, as long as the interest of the class in continued representation
by experienced counsel is not outweighed by the actual prejudice to the objectors of being opposed by their
former counsel.").
176. See Wininger v. SI Mgmt. L.P., 301 E3d 1115, 1122 (9th Cir. 2002) (interpreting an alleged conflict as
not necessarily requiring disqualification of class counsel and citing both Amchem and Lazy Oil Co.); Lazy Oil
Co., 166 E3d at 589 90 (refusing to deem class counsel impermissibly conflicted by virtue of promoting a class
settlement over the objection of class representatives or other class members because otherwise such class
members would have undue leverage over class counsel and the rest of the class).
177. Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815, 857 (1999) (noting two types of conflicts among class
members that were sufficiently severe to require sub-classing and separate counsel: (1) conflicts between both
currently injured and exposure-only plaintiffs, who had oppositional interests with regard to structuring and
allocation of any settlement fund; and (2) conflicts between class members who had pre- 1959 claims as to which
there was insurance coverage, and those who did not, a severe and direct conflict with regard to allocation in a
case involving a limited fund created by insurance); Amchem, 521 U.S. at 626 ("In significant respects, the
interests of those within the single class are not aligned. Most saliently, for the currently injured, the critical goal
is generous immediate payments. That goal tugs against the interest of exposure-only plaintiffs in ensuring an
ample, inflation-protected fund for the future.").
178. Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 45-46 (1940) ("In seeking to enforce the agreement the plaintiffs in [the
class action] suit were not representing the [collaterally attacking absent class members] whose substantial
interest is in resisting performance.") (bracketed text added).
179. Ortiz, 527 U.S. at 858 ("'[T]he benefits asbestos-exposed persons might gain from the establishment of
a grand-scale compensation scheme is a matter fit for legislative consideration,' but the determination whether
'proposed classes are sufficiently cohesive to warrant adjudication' must focus on 'questions that preexist any
settlement,"' (citing and quoting Amchem, 521 U.S. at 625 28)).
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Some agreements to contractually reallocate fee awards among counsel to
enable cost profits may similarly be deemed to create intolerable rather than
tolerable conflicts; but others should be able to pass muster. The nuanced,
multi-factored risk-assessment that courts have used to determine if class
members' divergent interests render class counsel impermissibly conflicted has
not been consistently and overtly applied to evaluate class counsel's conflicts
flowing from fee allocation contracts among counsel. But there is no reason to
believe that counsel's loyalty should be assessed differently in the two settings. 180
In Agent Orange, the Second Circuit noted but did not share Judge Weinstein's
confidence in the existence of other structural assurances of fairness to counteract
the pull toward early settlement, including both the lodestar method's tendency to
inspire delay (to generate more hours for a higher fee) 18 1 and the trial court's role
as fiduciary for the class. 18 2 Such pessimism about the trial court undoubtedly
reflects in part the examples of judges behaving badly, approving manifestly
defective settlements, something some intermediate appellate judges, including,
most vividly and colorfully, Judge Posner, have exposed in recent decades. 183 But
it ignores the contrary examples of trial court judges who carefully scrutinize
settlements and provide a meaningful bulwark against self-seeking by class
counsel. 18 4 Moreover, it does not consider how structural fairness can be
achieved without dependence upon the judge as gatekeeper at the time of
settlement. For example, had the agreement among counsel been disclosed
earlier, the court could have built in other structural assurances of fairness,
including a requirement that all class counsel agree to any proposed settlement,
which, in that case, would have prevented cost-investing counsel who had a
180. In the non-class setting, Rule 1.7 is the general concurrent conflicts rule, while Rule 1.8 addresses
specific conflicts that may arise between lawyer and client (with fees and costs are covered Rule 1.5). But as
Professor Moore has argued, Rule 1.8 supplements (and does not supplant) Rule 1.7. Nancy J. Moore, Ethical
Issues in Mass Tort Plaintiffs' Representation: Beyond the Aggregate Settlement Rule, 81 FORDHAM L. REv.
3233, 3238 (2013). Thus, in at least some circumstances e.g., where a lawyer's disparate fee arrangements
with distinct clients in a mass tort make it reasonably obvious at the outset of litigation that the lawyer will be
conflicted on allocation issues it may be appropriate to consider fee-related conflicts using the Model Rule 1.7
frame. Id. at 3246.
181. In re Agent Orange Prod. Liab. Litig., 818 F.2d 216, 225 (2d Cir. 1987) ("Equally unpersuasive is the
district court's determination that the potential incentive to settle early is offset by an incentive, fostered by the
lodestar formula, to prolong the litigation.").
182. Id. at 224 ("We also reject the district court's finding that its authority to approve settlement offers under
FED. R. Civ. P. 23(e) acts to limit the threat to the class from a potential conflict of interest.").
183. See, e.g., Reynolds v. Beneficial Nat'l Bank, 288 F.3d 277, 283 (7th Cir. 2002) ("Although there is no
proof that the settlement was actually collusive in the reverse-auction sense, the circumstances demanded closer
scrutiny than the district judge gave it.").
184. See, e.g., Custom LED, LLC v. eBay, Inc., No. 12-vc-00350-JST, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 122022, at
*18 22 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 27, 2013) (Judge Tigar rejected this proposed class settlement as inadequate due to,
among other things, inadequate notice and overbroad release provisions.); Authors Guild v. Google Inc., 770 E
Supp. 2d 666, 669 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (Judge Chin rejected a proposed class action settlement agreement as giving
Google an unfair advantage over competitors and containing an overbroad release).
CLASS COUNSEL AS LITIGATION FUNDERS
majority of the leadership positions from forcing a premature settlement on
time-investing counsel.
Also, the Second Circuit considered the likely cost associated with a conflict
manifesting, but did not balance conflicts flowing from the reallocation agree-
ment against the agreement's propensity to enhance the alignment of class
counsel's and class members' interests. At the time the agreement by counsel was
made, class members' paramount interest was in finding deep pockets to fund the
litigation. Failure to induce that kind of investment would have left them with
nothing, surely a worse outcome, from their vantage point, than a premature
settlement. Put differently, it is not enough to know if counsel's incentives will be
misaligned with cost profits created by a particular agreement among counsel;
instead, one needs to also consider the misalignment of incentives in the absence
of the agreement. In Agent Orange, arguably, counsel's incentive in the absence
of the cost profits they attempted to achieve via contract was to fold the
proverbial tent, i.e., to abandon or cheaply settle plaintiffs' claims for lack of
funding. Class members would arguably have been worse off without the
agreement, because they would have been left with counsel who were even more
likely to be disloyal than were cost-investing counsel. 
185
Nor did the court properly conduct this risk assessment in light of the unique
features of the class action as a procedural device, one that requires class counsel
to serve as litigation funders of first resort. Instead, the court suggested in a
conclusory fashion that if cost investment required a 3.0 multiplier as a return to
induce it, the case must have been a weak one. 18 6 The court had no basis for this
conclusion other than its bald assertion that a 3.0 multiplier seemed like a higher
rate of return than what non-litigation investors might expect. 18 7 The strength of
the plaintiffs' claims in Agent Orange is debatable, but-at the time the court
wrote of its weakness-the matter had just settled for $180 million. Moreover, a
case is not weak merely because it requires substantial cost investment, though
limited access to capital can make the firms prosecuting such cases relatively
weak compared to defense counsel with deep pocket clients. The significance of
the 3.0 return contractually guaranteed to cost investing counsel in Agent Orange
cannot be appreciated without some understanding of the market for return on
capital investment in class actions, a topic explored more fully below.
To decide if a particular conflict-e.g., the conflict generated by the award of
cost profits by agreement of counsel at the front end of a particular case-renders
class counsel impermissibly conflicted, the agreement should be run through the
full gauntlet of factors impacting that determination, something the Second
185. Instead of balancing the reallocation agreement's tendency to align counsel's and the class members'
interests against its tendency to cause them to diverge, the court simply dismissed the beneficial incentive
effects as speculative. In re Agent Orange Prod. Liab. Litig., 818 F.2d 216, 225 (2d Cir. 1987).
186. Id. at 225 26.
187. Id. at 226.
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Circuit did incompletely in Agent Orange. A more nuanced assessment may have
changed the outcome. The Second Circuit would have considered the net costs
and benefits in terms of the effect of the fee reallocation agreement on counsel's
loyalty. Moreover, the court might have given greater weight to Judge Wein-
stein's holdings regarding both the need to facilitate litigation financing in
expensive mass actions and the ability of courts to assure structural fairness to
counteract any conflicts arising from funding agreements.
Whether or not the outcome in Agent Orange would have been different had
the Second Circuit conducted a more thorough and open-minded risk-
assessment, future agreements to reallocate fee awards to reward costs should be
able to overcome some of the difficulties counsel in that case created for
themselves. That is, even in the absence of the kind of doctrinal change regarding
fee and cost reward methodology advocated as a policy matter in this Article,
class counsel may be able to ethically negotiate fee reallocation agreements to
reward cost investment, particularly if the agreement is disclosed to the court and
the agreement's terms are reasonable, a subject addressed in greater detail in the
following section.
IV. CALCULATING "REASONABLE" COST PROFITS-MARKET MEASURES
Once we acknowledge that cost profits may be awarded in class actions, the
question shifts from their permissibility to their measure. The most obvious
mechanisms for delivering direct cost profits would be, as with fees, an initial
markup from actual cost to market rate (to the extent any gap exists), and an
actual or effective multiplier on costs.18 8 The question this Section addresses is
not how such cost profits might be awarded but whether our existing doctrinal
framework gives courts guidance as to the amount of such profits in a given case.
A useful starting point is Rule 23(h), which authorizes a court overseeing a
class action to award "reasonable attorney's fees and nontaxable costs." In class
actions fee and cost award jurisprudence, the "market" provides a central
touchstone for determining a reasonable fee, though jurisdictions' understanding
of and commitment to market principles varies. 18 9 When determining the fee to
188. See Ratner & Rubenstein, supra note 6, at 607 11 (canvassing vehicles for the award of cost profits).
189. All jurisdictions adopt a market approach to the lodestar by reference to rates charged in the relevant
market (usually the community, e.g., the district). See, e.g., Missouri v. Jenkins, 491 U.S. 274, 285 (1989) ("We
have consistently looked to the marketplace as our guide to what is 'reasonable."'); Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S.
886, 895 (1984) (The hourly rate used in lodestar calculations in Section 1988 cases should be a market rate
determined by reference to "prevailing market rates in the relevant community."). Variability regarding the
centrality of the market measure is most evident when the percentage-of-fund method is used, and courts are
called upon to select a percentage to apply to the fund. Compare Vizcaino v. Microsoft Corp., 290 E3d 1043,
1049 (9th Cir. 2002) ("[W]e do not adopt the Seventh Circuit's approach in percentage fee award cases, as set
forth in In re Continental Illinois Secs. Litig., 962 F.2d 566, 568 (7th Cir. 1992). There, that court stated that in
awarding fees in common fund cases, courts should determine a reasonable fee by attempting to replicate the
market. While an exclusively market-based approach may have superficial appeal, in the context of class action
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award under the lodestar method, courts assess lawyers' hourly rates1 90 by
reference to the rates charged by lawyers of similar skill, experience, and
reputation doing similar work in the relevant market.1 91 With regard to
percentage fee awards, some courts have looked to percentage awards in similar
categories of litigation to establish a market measure of reasonableness. 192 What
is the market for cost investment in litigation against which the reasonableness of
direct cost profits could be assessed? This section considers five options:
lawyer-client contracts in individual, non-class cases; the rates charged by
third-party litigation funders; the market reflected by private contracts among
class counsel; the market mimicked by judges acting as would sophisticated and
informed consumers of legal services; and the market for time investment. The
last two market measures (judges as client surrogates and the market for time)
most naturally lend themselves to the project of normalizing of rewards on time
and cost investment by class counsel.
A. LAWYER-CLIENT CONTRACTS IN NON-CLASS CONTINGENT FEE CASES
Information regarding lawyer-client contracts in non-class contingent fee
matters is unlikely to provide much insight into the market for direct cost profits.
With client consent, lawyers may mark up their actual costs to market rates; 193
charge interest on costs advanced calculated from the date the cost is advanced,
litigation in which attorney's fees are determined post hoc by the court (without regard to any private
arrangement), it may in many cases be illusory."), withIn re Synthroid Mktg. Litig., 264 F.3d 712, 718 (7th Cir.
2001) ("We have held repeatedly that, when deciding on appropriate fee levels in common-fund cases, courts
must do their best to award counsel the market price for legal services, in light of the risk of nonpayments and
the normal rate of compensation in the market at the time.").
190. See Jenkins, 491 U.S. at 285 ("we have consistently looked to the marketplace as our guide to what is
'reasonable."'); Blum, 465 U.S. at 895 (the hourly rate used in lodestar calculations in Section 1988 cases
should be a market rate determined by reference to "prevailing market rates in the relevant community"); Alan
Hirsch & Diane Sheehey, Awarding Attorneys'Fees and Managing Fee Litigation, FED. JUDICIAL CTR. 23 (1994)
available at http://www.fjc.gov/public/pdf.nsf/lookup/attyfees.pdf/$File/attyfees.pdf ("The reasonable rate is
determined by reference to the marketplace.").
191. See, e.g., Jordan v. Multnomah County, 815 F.2d 1258, 1262 (9th Cir. 1987) ("The fee applicant has the
burden of producing satisfactory evidence, in addition to the affidavits of its counsel, that the requested rates are
in line with those prevailing in the community for similar services of lawyers of reasonably comparable skill
and reputation.").
192. See, e.g., Wolff v. Cash, No. 03-33778-CIV-COHN/TORRES, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 153786, at *13
(S.D. Fla. 2012) ("The requested fee of 33% is at the market rate which the Class could have negotiated at the
beginning of this matter."); Nilsen v. York Cnty., 400 F Supp. 2d 266, 279 (D. Me. 2005) ("Unfortunately, in
this case I do not have direct data on the market price for civil rights class action lawyers, or for strip search class
action cases inside or outside of Maine .... But there should be contextual market information available, such
as what lawyers charge as percentage fees for various types of litigation."). In securities cases under the PSLRA,
the fee negotiated by the class representative may be the best evidence of the market fee.
193. ABA Formal Op. 93-379, at 5 ("Thus, in the view of the Committee, the lawyer and the client may agree
in advance that, for example, photocopying will be charged at $.15 per page, or messenger services will be
provided at $5 per mile.").
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or from the date on which the client's bill is due; 194 or use a flat percentage of fees
to cover case costs in lieu of seeking reimbursement for actual costs. 19 5 But the
idea of clients paying a direct cost profit is a relatively new one, and thus is not a
standard feature of fee agreements. One could infer-not that direct cost
multipliers are merely novel-but that the market rate for cost profits is close to
zero, a conclusion that additional descriptive market data contradict, as described
in the following paragraphs. One might also conclude that lawyers are generally
satisfied with the kinds of indirect cost profits that flow from agreeing to invest
both time and costs in exchange for a percentage of the client's recovery, without
distinguishing profits on time and cost investment. That may be true, but in that
instance, lawyers are individually negotiating fee agreements with clients with
features that distinguish them from the class action fee awards: there is no
possibility that the lodestar method will be used, even as a cross-check on the
reasonableness of the fee; and there is no court selecting a percentage figure to
calculate the fee award after the fact using criteria that privilege time over cost
investment. That means that time and cost investment are equally capable of
producing an indirect cost profit in the typical non-class case, where the
contingent fee contract sets a percentage at the outset that is used to generate a fee
ex post, after the matter is successfully resolved. As a result, fee agreements in
such cases are not particularly instructive regarding the market rate for cost
investment.
B. THIRD-PARTY LITIGATION FUNDERS
Lawyers who use third-party financing and pass those costs on to their clients
are negotiating contracts with lenders that reveal direct profits on cost invest-
ment. In the third-party (alternative) litigation financing market, specialized
lenders providing funds as cost investment in particular cases publish informa-
tion regarding the direct cost profits they expect. 19 6 For example, Excalibur
Programs Funding, Inc. ("Excalibur"), 197 one of the leading third-party litigation
funders, provides "non-recourse" loans, meaning that repayment with interest
from any attorneys' fees ultimately obtained is contingent on a successful
resolution of the matter. The lender thus puts itself in a position similar to that
occupied by plaintiffs' counsel as litigation funder of first resort. Because the
194. See, e.g., L.A. Cnty. Bar Ass'n Prof'l Responsibility & Ethics Comm., Formal Ethics Op. No. 499
(1999), available at http://www.lacba.org/showpage.cfm?pageid-434 (finding cost interest charges ethical
under California ethics rules if properly specified in contract).
195. See, e.g., State Bar of Arizona, Opinion No. 94-10 (July 20, 1994) ("So long as the billing practice is
clearly disclosed to the client, the amount charged is reasonable and approximates the actual expenses
associated with such costs and the client consents in writing at the outset of the representation, the Committee is
of the opinion that charging a percentage of the fee to cover disbursements is permissible.").
196. See Engstrom, supra note 14, at 394 96.
197. Litigation Funding, EXCALIBUR FUNDING PROGRAMS, http://www.excaliburlegal.conindex.html (last
visited Nov. 11, 2014).
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lender bears the risk that the loan will not be repaid, such lending is "more
expensive than other avenues for capital." 1 98 Excalibur provides examples of its
pricing in the form of multipliers ranging from 1.4 to 2.6, depending on the time
it takes to successfully resolve the litigation.1 99 The cost multipliers listed on the
Excalibur website do not show multipliers applicable to case-specific loans that
require more than two years to repay, but logically more extended repayment
periods would justify higher multipliers.
The market for class counsel and other contingent fee lawyers is arguably
different from the market for third-party funders. Though they may be more
diversified than some law firms, third-party funders have only one source of
return on their non-recourse loans, the multipliers. If courts were to award class
counsel cost profits, however, class counsel would earn not only direct cost
profits in the form of a multiplier on cost investment, but, also indirect profits
associated with cost investment, including the fee that cost investment makes
possible. Because third-party funders do not enjoy these indirect benefits to the
same extent that class counsel would, their market rates may be higher than what
class counsel would earn in a world in which direct cost profits in class actions
were enabled. In addition, third-party lenders may charge a premium for the risk
associated with the agency costs that inhere in the lender-attorney relationship;
lenders, like principals in the attorney-client relationship, suffer information
asymmetries and monitoring costs, and, especially where loans are non-recourse,
may experience the disloyalty that stems from counsel's favoring of cases where
counsel acts as a funder of first resort. Nevertheless, the rates charged by
third-party lenders do reveal the direct profit levels necessary to attract the kind
of case investment that the award of such profits in class actions would be
designed to inspire.
C. AGREEMENTS AMONG COUNSEL TO REALLOCATE FEE AND
COST AWARDS
Agreements among lawyers regarding the rewards for cost investment in
jointly prosecuted litigation may provide yet another basis for characterizing the
market rate of direct cost profits. Interestingly, the pricing on cost investment
publicized by third-party lenders approximates the 3.0 multiplier on cost
investment the PMC members attempted to achieve by contract in Agent Orange.
The rewards for cost investment will be most apparent in cases like Agent Orange
where counsel invest costs and time unequally, so the disparate rewards flowing
from the two categories of investment are exposed. In cases where counsel agree
to contribute time and money investment in roughly equivalent proportions, the
198. Attorney Funding, EXACALIBUR FUNDING PROGRAMS, http://www.excaliburlegal.com/AttorneyPricing.
html (last visited Nov. 11, 2014).
199. Id.
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profits associated specially with cost investment may not be revealed.
The timing of such agreements may have some bearing on the extent to which
they evidence a general market measure of profits on cost investment. For
example, cost-investing counsel in Agent Orange appeared at a crisis moment in
the litigation, when time-investing counsel were financially depleted, suggesting
that they may have bargained for rewards on cost investment that reflected
existing counsel's desperation. Existing Agent Orange counsel who needed
additional funds to continue the litigation were heavily invested in that case,
having already advanced substantial time and costs, such that failure to obtain
new investment would have exposed them to significant losses. As a result, the
3.0 multiplier on cost investment to which counsel agreed may not fairly
represent the market's general approach to rewarding cost investment in class
actions. Agreements regarding the reward of time and cost investment reached
among participating counsel at the outset of a litigation matter may better capture
the way lawyers organizing to finance litigation treat time and cost investment.
D. THE "MARKET" CREATED BY JUDGES AS CONSUMERS OF LEGAL
SERVICES ON BEHALF OF CLASSES
Assuming courts start awarding direct cost profits, the most relevant "market"
may be the awards made by judges in other cases.20 0 Judges may mimic the
market by positing themselves as sophisticated and informed consumers of legal
services negotiating rewards on time and cost investment at the outset of
litigation. Faced with a fee and cost award petition from successful class counsel
at the end of a class action, a judge would hew to the agreement a sophisticated
client would likely have negotiated at the front end.
A sophisticated client would want to reward counsel in a way that minimizes
agency costs, or, put differently, best aligns the interests of class counsel and the
class. As a result, the client would be inclined to eliminate the bias in favor of
time investment.20 1 Judges could move toward this goal by equalizing the direct
reward on time and cost investment. For example, in a case where the court is
awarding a percentage fee using a lodestar cross-check, the lodestar crosscheck
could include both marked up time and similarly marked-up costs, with the same
multiplier applied to both. Judges acting as sophisticated consumers might go
further, not only normalizing the treatment of time and cost investment, but
rewarding counsel for getting the right mix of time and cost investment, by, for
example, putting the burden on counsel to demonstrate they made the kind of
200. See Nilsen v. York Cnty., 400 E Supp. 2d 266, 279 (D. Me. 2005) ("[T]he class action 'market' is
controlled by judges. That is why this is a market 'mimicking' approach .... In the meantime, I look to such
evidence as is available to suggest what hypothetical negotiation would have produced at the outset as an
agreed-to fee for a case such as this.").
201. See Ratner & Rubenstein, supra note 6, at 607 13.
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case investment that produced the greatest net award for the class members.20 2 As
fiduciaries for the class, judges should particularly press this issue with regard to
categories of investment where, for example, cost investment tends to save
clients money, e.g., with regard to the use of LPOs for document reviews.
E. THE MARKET FOR TIME INVESTMENT
Finally, the market for attorney labor may suggest a market measure for cost
profits. From the investing law firm's vantage point, time and cost investment
both involve dollar outlays, time calculated as the firm's overhead per lawyer for
each hour of lawyer time available to invest, and case-specific cost investment as
dollars paid out. From the contingent fee client's perspective, time and cost
investment are both necessary. For example, the plaintiff in a product defect
lawsuit may need both her attorney's labor and the testimony of a paid expert to
establish the defect, causation, or other issues in the case. Both types of
investment are equally necessary to establish her claim and are part of the
package of services she expects her lawyer to provide or procure on her behalf.
As noted, lawyers enjoy two layers of profit on time investment. The first is the
gap between the cost to the firm of supplying attorney labor and the price per hour
charged for that labor. A firm might mark up the costs of supplying attorney time
by, say, 100 percent; if clients are willing to pay that markup, then it could be
argued that the firm's market rate includes a 100 percent profit on outlays in
general-a rule of thumb that could be applied to all outlays, including cost
investment.
The second source of direct profit on time is the multiplier. Professor Brian
Fitzpatrick's comprehensive survey of federal class action settlements and fee
awards reveals that multipliers on lodestar "ranged from 0.07 to 10.3, with a
mean of 1.65 and a median of 1.34. "203 Under current practice, only time
investment is multipliable. In a regime where both time and cost investment are
multipliable, courts may end up awarding lower multipliers to keep the combined
amount of fee and cost awards under the new regime in line with current norms.
That likely downward trend in average multipliers can be taken into account as a
factor in applying the data on rewards on time investment to characterize the
market for cost investment.
202. Trial courts routinely perform a similar task with regard to time investment under the lodestar method,
reviewing it to ensure that it was made efficiently, e.g., without excessive duplication. See, e.g., Wolph v. Acer
Am. Corp., No. C 09-01314 JSW, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 151180, at *6 12 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 21, 2013) (carefully
scrutinizing counsel's time investment to avoid rewarding inefficiency and duplication).
203. Fitzpatrick, supra note 42, at 834.
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F THE MARKET MEASURES THAT BEST NORMALIZE THE REWARDS ON
TIME AND COST INVESTMENT
The first three market measures identified above are inferior from the
perspective of harnessing class counsel's profit motive in the service of the goals
of loyal and adequate private law enforcement, because those measures
perpetuate or exacerbate the differential in the reward on time and cost
investment. Treating the cost rewards negotiated by contracting parties in
non-class cases as the relevant market can lead to the incorrect inference that
direct cost-investment rewards should remain at zero. Third-party funder
contracts may overstate the market profits on cost investment due to the unique
position of such funders and may also produce a number that varies from the
reward on time investment. And both third-party funders and cost-investing
counsel who negotiate reallocated fee awards may enter into litigation investment
agreements at points where existing counsel are particularly vulnerable and
desperate, such that their contracts may reflect peculiar problems with the cases
in which investment is being made rather than a more generalizable value of cost
investment.
The last of the two market measures considered above-the market created by
judges and the market for time investment-most squarely address the case
investment distortions described in Section II. That is because they counteract the
basic cause of those distortions, i.e., the unequal reward on time and cost
investment. A market measure that considers either the cost profits awarded by
judges acting as sophisticated client surrogates or the profits on time can lead to
the same place-equal treatment of time and cost investment. Both market
measures have the potential to eliminate or reduce the bias in favor of time
investment in class actions.
V. CONCLUSION
Cost profits have traditionally foundered on ethical shoals. But they need not.
A proper reading of the applicable ethics rules would move (or stop drawing) the
boundary lines that have prevented parties and courts from more fully exploring
opportunities to better align the interests of class counsel and class members.
Those poorly drawn boundaries fail to fully recognize the professional role
played by class counsel as court-appointed litigation funders. Reasonable profits
to compensate class counsel for properly performing that distinctive role may be
grounded in market measures, as to which there are ample data.
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